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I. INTRODUCTION
Where were the lawyers? Perhaps rhetorical, even sarcastic, this
question is being asked all too frequently after large financial frauds.
"[W]ith all the professional talent involved," mused Judge Sporkin in a
decision growing out of the Lincoln Savings & Loan scandal, "why
[didn't] at least one... [blow] the whistle to stop the overreaching that
took place in this case[?]" 1 The Lincoln matter alone ensnared a num-
ber of the country's most prominent law firms," and many others have
been blamed in comparable, if less notorious, banking delicts. Clark
Clifford's indictment in the BCCI proceeding has extended the dark
shadow even further up the reputational hierarchy.3
The banking problems are only the most recent problems that
have provoked the question of complicity and generated extensive,
emotional counterreaction by the bar. SEC v. National Student
Marketing Corp.4 in the 1970s and In re OPM Leasing Services,
1. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990).
2. Most notably, the prestigious New York law firm of Kaye Scholer Fierman & Handler
agreed to pay a $41 million fine, along with extensive ancillary relief, in settling a government
enforcement action. See OTS Freezes Kaye, Scholer's Assets, Asks for $275 Million in Restitution,
58 BNA Banking Rep. 419 (Mar. 9, 1992); OTS, Kaye, Scholer Agree to Settle; Firm Will Pay $41
Million Restitution, 58 BNA Banking Rep. 472 (Mar. 16, 1992). The government's action against
Kaye Scholer was quite controversial, at least with respect to freezing the firm's assets. Compare
John C. Coffee, Jr., Due Process for Kaye, Scholer?, Legal Times 22 (Mar. 16, 1992) with Steve
France, Just Deserts: Don't Cry for Kaye, Scholer, Legal Times 28 (Apr. 6, 1992). Other firms also
have faced charges of complicity in the Lincoln matter. See Miriam Rozen, Jones, Day Hit By
Lincoln Savings Fallout-Again, American Lawyer 34 (Mar. 1992).
3. Steve Lohr, Indictment Charges Clifford Took Bribes: Broader Inquiry into B.C.C.I. Dis-
closed, N.Y. Times Al (July 30, 1992).
4. 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978). In the early 1970s, the SEC charged attorneys at two
major law firms, New York's White & Case and Chicago's Lord, Bissell & Brook, with aiding in
large-scale securities fraud by failing to stop the closing of a merger between National Student
Marketing Corporation and Interstate National Corporation. Id. at 686-87. The filing of the com-
plaint generated a massive outpouring of legal commentary, largely critical of the Commission for
imposing a chill on the attorney-client relationship. Among the better critical analyses, see Joseph
C. Daley and Roberta S. Karmel, Attorneys' Responsibilities: Adversaries at the Bar of the SEC,
24 Emory L. J. 747 (1975); Frederick D. Lipman, The SEC's Reluctant Police Force: A New Role
for Lawyers, 49 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 437 (1974); Simon M. Lorne, The Corporate and Securities Ad-
viser, the Public Interest, and Professional Ethics, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 423 (1978). For more sympa-
thetic accounts, see the remarks of then SEC Commissioner A. A. Sommer, Jr., The Emerging
Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer, [1973-74 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
79,631 (Feb. 6, 1974). See also Lewis D. Lowenfels, Expanding Public Responsibilities of Securi-
ties Lawyers: An Analysis of the New Trend in Standard of Care and Priorities of Duties, 74
Colum. L. Rev. 412 (1974); Samuel H. Gruenbaum, Corporate/Securities Lawyers: Disclosure, Re-
sponsibility, Liability to Investors, and National Student Marketing Corp., 54 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 795 (1979). Concern about the SEC's enforcement philosophy was renewed with its enforce-
ment action against two Wall Street attorneys for their alleged role in the false publicity generated
by their client National Telephone Co., In re Carter and Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 82,847 (Feb. 8, 1981), but assuaged somewhat by the Commission's ultimate
disposition of the matter. See notes 25-26.
CLIENT FRAUD
Inc.5 in the early 1980s were focal points for self-examination, weighing
heavily upon the American Bar Association's reformulation of its ethi-
cal rules in 1983.8 Attorney involvement in insider trading also has been
quite visible.7
In all fairness, of course, we do not know whether a serious problem
really exists.8 The scandals, publicized more through indictments and
allegations than legal findings of complicity, are highly salient, vivid
bits of information that naturally skew our impressions. We lack actual
base-rate data establishing the incidence of complicity, or documenta-
tion of the offsetting events when attorney involvement has somehow
deterred client misconduct. Still, the apparent incidence of complicity
must trouble both the public and the profession.
This Article explores the concept of observed lawyer complicity
without making any claims about its extent. It focuses less on the nor-
mative issue-what rules shold govern lawyer conduct-than the be-
havioral one-why the apparent involvement might be so extensive.
The Article takes the behavioral approach for two reasons. First, under-
standing the forces underlying lawyers' behavior is interesting and im-
portant in and of itself, for it has received relatively scant attention in
the literature. Second, behavioral insights can help us gauge the likeli-
hood that particular changes in the prevailing legal regime may or may
not be effective.
To pose the question of attorney motivation is to invite a prompt
answer from many people: greed and moral corruption, of course. Law-
yers know of their clients' misdeeds, or at best deliberately close their
eyes to the evidence, simply to preserve their wealth, status and power.
Those lawyers guess-often correctly, in all probability-that they will
never be caught. The stories behind the scandals only strengthen this
impression. Clark Clifford admitted that his involvement in BCCI al-
most forces the observer who reviews the evidence in retrospect to con-
5. 32 Bankr. R. 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). See text accompanying notes 128-34. See generally Rob-
ert P. Gandossy, Bad Business (Basic Books, 1985). OPM is the most commented upon of the
lawyer-fraud problem cases in the ethics and gatekeeper literature of the 1980s. See, for example,
Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as a Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent Harm, 70
Iowa L. Rev. 1091, 1109-11, 1118, 1149-50 (1985); Martin Riger, The Model Rules and Corporate
Practice-New Ethics for a Competitive Era, 17 Conn. L. Rev. 729, 731-32 (1985); Kenneth F.
Krach, Note, The Client-Fraud Dilemma: A Need for Consensus, 46 Md. L. Rev. 436, 437-43
(1987). It weighed particularly heavily when the ABA's new ethical rules were being finalized.
6. This is not to suggest that the ABA's new rules were revised to remedy the problem, as
opposed to reducing the exposure. See text accompanying notes 19-23.
7. For an overview, see Donald C. Langevoort, 18 Insider Trading: Regulation, Enforcement
and Prevention § 12.0313] (CPC, 1991) and sources cited therein.
8. The same can be said about more general claims regarding a lawyer's loss of the sense of
professionalism. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side
Perspective, 49 Md. L. Rev. 869, 873 n.3 (1990).
1993]
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clude that he was either stupid or venal.9 His career up to this point
rules out stupidity.
Without doubting that the venality hypothesis does explain some
of the misconduct, this Article looks for other possible explanations.
Part II is law-oriented and concentrates on lawyer involvement in com-
monplace business transactions, such as financing and control shifts. It
is often observed, and demonstrably true, that lawyers' professional
norms are conflicting. On one hand (and to an accelerating degree) the
profession and the law demand loyalty to clients and respect for even
their dark confidences. At the same time, an attorney's loyalty is sub-
ject to the overriding general norm, in both ethics and law, that lawyers
must not knowingly give substantial assistance to client fraud. This Ar-
ticle considers the possibility that this general norm has been under-
mined sufficiently that, at least implicitly, loyalty emerges as the
dominant justification, thus providing a basis for lawyers to rationalize
continued involvement. 10 This, however, is at best only a partial answer.
Part III is more speculative, but probably more important. It draws
heavily from recent work in the field of social cognition to raise the
possibility that lawyers have a diminished cognitive capacity to appreci-
ate the likely harm flowing from their clients' actions. Both ego and
stress can induce blind spots. By the time the lawyer actually becomes
aware of the wrong, his or her complicity already is fixed. Denial and
rationalization ensue. Only at the very late stages, if at all, is there
something like a conscious cover-up. Although there are ample in-
stances of conscious complicity, other cases of apparent complicity will
fall into this less blameworthy category.
In sum, this Article suggests that venality competes not so much
with stupidity as with honest, even good faith behavior that only in
hindsight seems incredible. We, of course, have no way of knowing the
empirical mix of these explanations, for most lawyer wrongdoers-even
the most venal-offer excuses that sound the same. Part IV turns
briefly to the question of whether the profession's own reputational in-
terest or some tinkering with the legal regime is likely to produce effi-
cient reductions in the incidence of complicity.
The analysis proceeds from two working assumptions. First, our le-
gal discussion will accept the idea that the issue of attorney complicity
is one of the appropriate incentives for deterrence. Lawyers are treated
9. David E. Rosenbaum, A Charm for Plebeian and Patrician, N.Y. Times C5 (July 30,
1992).
10. See Subin, 70 Iowa L. Rev. at 1171-72 (cited in note 5) (observing that the illusion of
loyalty may offer emotional comfort for attorney guilt). For a view that loyalty and confidentiality
are the heart of the profession's "nomos," see Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the
State, 70 N.C. L. Rev. 1389 (1992).
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as "gatekeepers," to borrow Reinier Kraakman's term." We structure
the legal rules to minimize the incidence of client fraud by directing
lawyers to withhold their services from miscreant clients. While the mo-
tivation to sue lawyers is overwhelmingly pecuniary, to get at a deep
pocket for what the plaintiff believes is just compensation, the prevail-
ing structure of the rules suggests a more functional design.
12
This Article also assumes that neither clients nor lawyers can be
categorized neatly as good or bad, honest or corrupt.' 3 While moral dis-
positions do vary, situations are apt to have an even greater influence
on behavior, and situations change over time. So far as clients are con-
cerned, we assume that while relatively few are either dispositionally
corrupt or involved in situations of extensive wrongdoing, there are not
many who are perfectly pure or without any troubles either. More spe-
cifically, lawyers in transactional settings often are exposed to facts re-
lating to the client or the situation that they would prefer not to find
and would rather withhold from the other parties. Lawyers operate in
very noisy, ambiguous, informational environments.
4
II. THE AMBIVALENCE OF THE GENERAL NORM
To say that there is a general norm prohibiting lawyers from assist-
ing client fraud means little without a closer examination of the precise
legal standards involved. Perhaps they are constructed in a way that
reduces the effectiveness of the general norm. If so, that alone might be
a reason for the observed incidence of attorney complicity.
11. Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Liability Strategy, 2
J. L. Econ. & Org. 53 (1986). See also Gilson, 49 Md. L. Rev. at 883 (cited in note 8). Gatekeeping
is slightly different from whistleblowing in that the latter imposes a duty to warn the victim or the
appropriate authorities, but the former simply commands inaction and withdrawal.
12. Nor is there reason to believe that attorneys' liability operates as a very good insurance
system. On the problems with liability as an asset insufficiency strategy in the context of manage-
rial activity on behalf of a corporation, see Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies
and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 Yale L. J. 857 (1984). In any event, the exclusion of this
possibility is not central to this Article's major points, and hence is left to separate inquiry.
Fraud relating to federally-insured financial institutions also is excluded from our legal analy-
sis. This is partly because of its greater emphasis on compensation, as well as its idiosyncratic
statutory and political ecology. For a discussion of the attorney liability issues with respect to
these institutions, see H. Brent Helms, Comment, Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act: An Ethical Quagmire for Attorneys Representing Financial Institutions, 27
Wake Forest L. Rev. 277 (1992).
13. See Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 589, 629
(1985). This is not to suggest that game theory could not generate interesting insights to the bar-
gains between attorneys and clients in light of the informational asymmetries they face; Jason
Scott Johnston, Opting In and Opting Out: Bargaining for Fiduciary Duties in Cooperative Ven-
tures, 70 Wash. U. L. Q. 291 (1992).
14. The law, of course, tends not to impose a duty of full disclosure of even material adverse
facts, but simply precludes lawyers and their clients from misrepresenting them or telling half-
truths. Thus, the mere possession of adverse information does not imply the presence of fraud.
Hence, the discovery of unfortunate facts does not necessarily signal client wrongdoing.
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There are a number of disparate legal rules governing the behavior
of business lawyers in transactional settings, which together buttress
the general norm.15 They fall into two principal categories. Some are
knowledge-based, imposing liability only when the lawyer has an aware-
ness, or is presumed to have such, of client misconduct. Others are neg-
ligence doctrines, creating responsibilities once the lawyer notices
something amiss, and in limited respects, imposing an affirmative obli-
gation of diligent investigation on the attorney to assure the legitimacy
of at least some aspects of the transaction.
A. Knowledge-Based Regimes
1. Ethical Rules
Although ethical rules do not by themselves create liability to third
persons, they have the potential to inform third-party litigation on ap-
propriate standards of conduct. 16 Indeed, the ABA's most recent effort
to codify standards of ethics, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
was born of something of an obsession with that risk.17 In addition,
there is the remote possibility that a transactional lawyer will be disci-
plined for impropriety.'8 Hence, the ethical rules deserve some consid-
eration as potential liability constructs.
Prior to the Model Rules, most states based their rules of lawyer
ethics on the Code of Professional Responsibility, with its amalgam of
disciplinary rules and ethical considerations. With respect to the duties
of lawyers toward third persons in the event of client fraud, the Code
was particularly murky, but could be construed, at least as originally
15. Useful overviews of these standards specifically for business lawyers can be found in a
number of sources. See, for example, Marc I. Steinberg, Corporate and Securities Malpractice
(PLI, 1992); Robert Haft, Liability of Attorneys and Accountants for Securities Transactions
(Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1991). See generally Ronald E. Mallen and Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal
Malpractice chs. 6-7 (West, 3d ed. 1988).
16. Courts differ on whether ethics rules may be invoked at all in malpractice and related
liability proceedings. Compare FDIC v. O'Melveny & Myers, 969 F.2d 744, 748 n.4 (9th Cir. 1992)
with Tew v. Arky, Freed, St'earns, et al., 655 F. Supp. 1571, 1573 (S.D. Fla. 1987), aff'd, 846 F.2d
753 (11th Cir. 1988). For a discussion of this issue, see Charles N. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics §
2.6 at 51-53 (West, 2d ed. 1986). Nothing here is meant to disparage the ethical rules in their
purely aspirational or educational function, which may play a useful role in guiding behavior, espe-
cially of younger professionals. See Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J.
Legal Educ. 31, 46-47 (1992).
17. See Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 14 L. & Soc. Inquiry 677 (1989).
18. Ethical disciplinary actions against business lawyers or lawyers in large firms are exceed-
ingly rare. Placing responsibility for assuring appropriate conduct by corporate lawyers on their
clients and injured third parties may be a more efficient enforcement mechanism. See David B.
Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 799 (1992).
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drafted, to obligate the lawyer to prevent or rectify the fraud. Although
the Model Rules reorient the emphasis, 19 the general norm is still stated
clearly: "A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client,
in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent.... 2 o With
regard to truthfulness in negotiations and other nonlitigation contexts,
the lawyer may not knowingly "make a false statement of material fact
or law to a third person" or knowingly "fail to disclose a material fact
to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a crimi-
nal or fraudulent act by a client."2 The nondisclosure standard, how-
ever, is limited by an overarching duty of confidentiality. The lawyer
may not reveal information relating to the client's representation to an-
yone without the client's consent, except to prevent imminent death or
substantial bodily harm or in cases where it is necessary for the lawyer's
self-defense.2 2 Read together, the Model Rules plainly create a gate-
19. This shift was a centerpiece of the debate over the Model Rules and it has received
extensive academic commentary. The best source of background on the meaning of the standard,
albeit from the perspective of one heavily involved in the process, is Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Recti-
fication of Client Fraud: Death and Revival of a Professional Norm, 33 Emory L. J. 271 (1984).
Criticism abounds. See, for example, Subin, 70 Iowa L. Rev. 1091 (cited in note 5); Stephen Gillers,
What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical View of the Model Rules, 46
Ohio St. L. J. 243 (1985). Under the Code, some form of which still is in effect in a number of
states, Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) states that when a lawyer had information clearly establish-
ing that a client had perpetrated a fraud in the course of the representation, the lawyer shall call
upon the client to rectify it, and if the client does not, "shall reveal the fraud to the affected
person." A 1974 amendment, however, limited the duty to disclose when the information is pro-
tected as a privileged communication. See Hazard, 33 Emory L. J. at 293-94 & n. 38. A very good
discussion of the Code as it relates to lawyers' liability issues is found in Junius Hoffman, On
Learning of a Corporate Client's Crime or Fraud-the Lawyer's Dilemma, 33 Bus. Law. 1389
(1978).
20. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(d) (1983). The best overview of the
substantial assistance problem is Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., How Far May a Lawyer Go in Assisting
a Client in Legally Wrongful Conduct?, 35 U. Miami L. Rev. 669 (1981). See also Wolfram, Mod-
ern Legal Ethics at § 13.3 (cited in note 16); Geoffrey C. Hazard and W. William Hodes, The Law
of Lawyering § 1.2.500 (Prentice Hall, 2d ed. 1990). A rare example of a disciplinary proceeding is
In re Blatt, 324 A.2d 15 (N.J. 1974). Knowledge is actual knowledge, though it may be inferred
from the circumstances. See Model Rules, Scope note [5]. The question of knowledge under the
Rules is discussed thoughtfully in W. William Hodes, The Code of Professional Responsibility,
The Kutak Rules, and the Trial Lawyer's Code: Surprisingly, Three Peas in a Pod, 35 U. Miami
L. Rev. 739, 802-10 (1981), with the observation that knowledge often will be difficult to prove in
cases where the lawyer says that the client duped him, unless the client wishes to drag the lawyer
down with it.
21. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.1 (1983).
22. Id. Rule 1.6 (1983). The self-defense exception permits the lawyer to divulge confidences
when charged with wrongdoing by either the client or a third party. Though perfectly sensible, this
exception is at odds with the ABA's more general claim that clients must have nearly absolute
confidence that lawyers will not reveal confidential information, the underlying theory behind the
Model Rules' newly restrictive formulations. The lawyer must resign rather than facilitate client
fraud, and the rules relating to resignation quite possibly allow the lawyer to do so "noisily," i.e., in
such a way that effectively blows the whistle on client misconduct notwithstanding the confidenti-
ality rules. See Ronald D. Rotunda, The Notice of Withdrawal and the New Model Rules of Pro-
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keeper rather than whistleblower regime, directing the lawyer to with-
hold services or withdraw rather than disclose the fraud to potential
victims.
Although a majority of states follow some form of the Model Rules,
others continue to adhere to the more open-ended formulations of the
earlier Code of Professional Responsibility. A few Model Rule-based
states modify the ethical duties. New Jersey, for instance, has revised
the duty of confidentiality to oblige lawyers to warn the appropriate
authorities when they know of client fraud that threatens severe finan-
cial harm.
s -
With respect to securities practice, the SEC authorizes the disbar-
ment of lawyers practicing before it who are guilty of irresponsible pro-
fessional behavior.24 The Commission is not bound by ABA or state-
level norms. Although its ethics component rarely has been invoked
over the past decade, the Commission has construed Rule 2(e) to pro-
hibit attorneys from passively acquiescing when they become aware of
client fraud.25 Consistent with the Model Rules, the SEC has not im-
posed any whistleblowing obligation. 6
fessional Conduct: Blowing the Whistle and Waving the Red Flag, 63 Or. L. Rev. 455 (1984);
Hazard, 33 Emory L. J. at 304-08 (cited in note 19). At the prompting of corporate and securities
members of the bar, an effort was made in 1991 to have the ABA amend Rule 1.6 to permit disclo-
sure when the lawyer believes that his services were used to perpetuate a fraud. The motion was
defeated. See Richard M. Phillips, Client Fraud and the Securities Lawyer's Duty of Confidenti-
ality, 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 823, 828-29 (1992).
23. New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (West 1991). The New Jersey Rule
was the basis for a malpractice action by a nonclient when the attorney failed to blow the whistle.
See Philadelphia Reserve Supply Co. v. Nowalk & Assoc., No. 91-0449, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12745 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 1992).
24. SEC Rule 2(c).
25. In re Carter and Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,847
(Feb. 28, 1981). Rule 2(e) allows for suspension or disbarment when attorneys either willfully vio-
late or willfully aid and abet a violation of the securities laws, or are found to be "lacking in
character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct." In Carter
and Johnson, the Commission found that two Wall Street attorneys did not willfully aid or abet
their clients' violations of the securities laws in covering up financial difficulty through false filings
and press releases, but they did act improperly in not taking stronger action to remedy the prob-
lem. For example, the Commission suggested that they could have approached the company's
board of directors. However, the attorneys were not disciplined because the Commission believed
that they did not have fair notice of the prevailing ethical standard. See Mitchell F. Dolin, SEC
Rule 2(e) After Carter-Johnson: Toward a Reconciliation of Purpose and Scope, 9 Sec. Reg. L. J.
331 (1982); Steinberg, Corporate and Securities Malpractice at 170-77 (cited in note 15). Since
1981, all SEC Rule 2(e) actions against attorneys have proceded on the basis of primary or second-
ary violations of law, rather than merely improper conduct.
26. The Carter and Johnson opinion was specific in rejecting a duty to go over the head of
the client and directly to its shareholders. As noted earlier, the SEC in the 1970s raised the specter
of such an obligation in its enforcement action in the National Student Marketing case (see note
54), a cause celebre that provoked a strong backlash from the legal community. The Commission
was asked to impose a whistleblowing rule, but never adopted one. See Kent Gross, Attorneys and
Their Corporate Clients: SEC Rule 2(e) and the Georgetown "Whistle Blowing" Proposal, 3 Corp.
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2. Fraud
A common form of legal assistance rendered by lawyers is negotia-
tion. When lawyers speak on behalf of their clients, they assume the
same legal obligations as their clients regarding truth-telling: it is no
defense that the lies were told for the client's benefit so that the client
alone should be held responsible. Accordingly, attorneys may not
knowingly or recklessly make material misrepresentations, tell half-
truths, or conceal information when there is a duty to disclose if the
other party has a right to rely.28 Fraud is a common-law doctrine en-
forceable under state law. Antifraud doctrine also has been codified as a
matter of federal securities law, so long as the fraud touches the
purchase or sale of a security, as it often will in a financial setting under
Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.9 Under both state
and federal law, the duty of truthfulness is triggered when the lawyer
comes into sufficiently direct communication with the third parties so
as to bear primary responsibility for the flow of information.30 So long
as victims of fraud can establish reliance and causation they may re-
cover against the attorney under both state and federal securities law.
In securities matters, the SEC is empowered to bring enforcement pro-
L. Rev. 197 (1980). For a recent comprehensive survey of the Commission's use of Rule 2(e), see
Robert Emerson, Rule 2(e) Revisited: SEC Disciplining of Attorneys Since In re Carter, 29 Am.
Bus. L. J. 155 (1991).
27. See Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 343, 348 (1957); Mallen and Smith, Legal Mal-
practice at § 6.4 (cited in note 15); Hazard, 33 Emory L. J. at 678-79 (cited in note 19). For an
illustration, see Bongard v. Winter, 516 S.2d 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
28. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551 (1977). As to state of mind, fraud requires
either intentional or reckless deception. For a case imposing fraud liability when a lawyer specifi-
cally vouched for his client's probity, see Bonavire v. Wampler, 779 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir. 1985). In
contrast to Bonavire, most fraud cases brought against attorneys are ones alleging secondary
rather than primary liability. The line, however, is an indistinct one. See Molecular Technology
Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1991).
29. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992). On the re-
quired nexus between the fraud and a securities transaction, see James D. Cox, Robert W. Hillman
and Donald C. Langevoort, Securities Regulation 719-29 (Little Brown, 1991). Rule lob-5 requires
either intentional or reckless deception for primary liability. Id. at 730-40.
30. Precisely how direct the communication must be is not clear. For cases dealing with pri-
mary attorney liability in the absence of a formal opinion letter, see Breard v. Sachnoff & Weaver,
Ltd., 941 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991) (discussing liability with respect to drafting); Molecular Technol-
ogy v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1991) (discussing liability with respect to editing); In re
Rospatch Sec. Lit., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 96,939 (W.D. Mich. July 8, 1992) (discuss-
ing liability with respect to press releases and 10-K, 10-Q forms). Although the courts have not
done a very good job of distinguishing between primary and secondary liability, the test should not
be a particularly difficult one: primary liability is appropriate when the lawyer's involvement in the
disclosure materials is such that a reasonable investor would rely directly on her skill, diligence
and expertise in evaluating its contents. That would take into account both the extent of the
involvement and, more important, how much information was communicated to investors about
the attorneys' role.
1993]
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ceedings leading to possible civil penalties and equitable relief.3 1
3. Aiding and Abetting
A considerably broader and more complicated restraint on the law-
yer's ability to assist client wrongdoing derives from the joint tortfeasor
concept which creates tort liability for anyone who engages in concerted
tortious action with another or who "knows that the other's conduct
constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encour-
agement to the other.... - Somewhat unfortunately, many courts in
common-law cases refer to this as an aiding-and-abetting standard, bor-
rowing the name from the analogous criminal-law construct.3
While aiding and abetting a client's fraud is a common-law harm, it
has received substantially greater judicial attention with respect to at-
torney activity when used as a means of imposing secondary liability
under Rule 10b-5 3 4 In these federal law aiding-and-abetting cases, the
courts have pursued a complicated, and not entirely. coherent, gate-
keeper strategy. While complete synthesis is not possible,35 we can de-
31. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1988). There are many
other liability consequences to actual fraud. Willful fraud is criminal under a variety of theories
(for example, mail and wire fraud, false pretenses, conspiracy). Civil RICO is increasingly used
against attorneys who act improperly on behalf of their clients. A pattern of racketeering activity
may be established by showing more than one separate but related predicate violation such as mail
and wire fraud and securities fraud. If such a pattern produces a cognizable injury, the victim may
recover treble damages. For an examination of the use of RICO and other remedies with respect to
the issuance of false attorney's opinions, see John Freeman, Current Trends in Legal Opinion
Liability, 1989 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 235, 236-39 & n. 8.
32. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(b) (1977).
33. For a comprehensive review of common-law aiding and abetting, see Halberstam v.
Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The criminal law's locution may be unfortunate in that some
courts have been led to impose criminal-law limitations, for example, higher state-of-mind stan-
dards, on the liability construct, ostensibly to honor the concept's roots. For example, Abell v.
Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988). Although the term aiding and abetting is criminal
in nature, the underlying concept-the bar against knowingly giving substantial assistance to
wrongdoing-is based firmly in tort law, and is a civil-law doctrine. Much confusion could have
been avoided if the SEC and the early courts used the phrase "substantial assistance" in naming
the doctrine rather than "aiding and abetting." The criminal-law nature of aiding and abetting has
led a few courts to deny that it operates as a separate common-law tort. See, for example, Cenco,
Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1982). That, of course, is simply a matter
of semantics.
34. For good reviews of the case law involving secondary liability and the federal securities
laws, see Alan R. Bromberg and Lewis D. Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud: A
Critical Examination, 52 Alb. L. Rev. 637 (1988); William Kuehnle, Secondary Liability Under
the Federal Securities Laws-Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, Controlling Person and Agency,
14 J. Corp. L. 313 (1988); Haft, Liability of Attorneys at § 3.05 (cited in note 15); Steinberg,
Corporate and Securities Malpractice at § 2.4.1 (cited in note 15). The classic exposition, still
cited by many courts, is David Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aid-
ing and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification and Contribution, 120 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 597 (1972).
35. The Seventh Circuit stands apart from the other federal courts of appeals, severely re-
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scribe its rough contours:
(1) Attorneys and others will be held jointly and severally liable if
they assist client fraud with the requisite degree of scienter (i.e., intent
to deceive). If the lawyer is said to owe a duty to the defrauded person,
then that standard will be satisfied by showing either actual awareness
or reckless disregard of the fraud.3 6 The courts divide in describing
recklessness: some emphasize a subjective standard, such as deliberate
disregard of the truth; others use an objective one that tends to blend
indistinguishably into gross negligence.
3 7
(2) A duty exists whenever there is a fiduciary relationship or one
of trust and confidence. That rarely will be the case except when the
lawyer is at the same time also representing the victim. However, a fair
number of courts also are willing to find a duty when a lawyer dissemi-
nates information under her own name at the client's behest, such as in
an opinion letter, understanding that it is meant to be relied upon by
an identifiable class of third-party investors. 8 The result is far less
clear when the attorney is involved merely in the preparation of general
disclosure documentation that will be disseminated under the client's
name. One notable case, Abell v. Potomac Insurance Co., 39 held that
stricting the availability of aiding-and-abetting liability, and even raising questions about its via-
bility as a matter of legislative intent. See, for example, Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes &
Holt, 797 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1986); DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1990). The
Seventh Circuit has suggested that all liability for aiding and abetting requires some breach of
common-law duty, and that the defendant must himself have committed one of the deceptive or
manipulative acts making up the underlying violation. See generally Joel Feldman, The Break-
down of Securities Fraud Aiding and Abetting Liability: Can a Uniform Standard Be Resur-
rected?, 19 Sec. Reg. L. J. 45 (1991) (suggesting that the Ninth Circuit is somewhat-aberrational,
albeit in its liberality rather than its conservatism). For a careful survey of the law from the SEC's
perspective (with a natural tendency toward expansive construction), see Kuehnle, 14 J. Corp. L.
313.
36. See, for example, Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 91 (2d Cir. 1983); FDIC v. First
Interstate Bank, 885 F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1989).
37. One of the common formulations is that recklessness is an "extreme departure from the
standards of ordinary care, [presenting] a danger of misleading buyers or sellers which is either
known to the defendant or is so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it." Woods v.
Barnett Bank, 765 F.2d 1004, 1010 (11th Cir. 1985), ,quoting Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642
F.2d 929, 961-62 (5th Cir. 1981). See generally Cox, Hillman and Langevoort, Securities Regula-
tion at 740 (cited in note 29). For an example of allegedly deliberate ignorance by a law firm
outside the scope of the securities laws, see Wyle v. R. J. Reynolds Ind., Inc., 709 F.2d 585, 590
(9th Cir. 1983).
38. See Andrea v. Friedlander, Gaines, Cohen, Rosenthal & Rosenberg, 660 F. Supp. 1362,
1368 (D. Conn. 1987) and cases cited therein. This risk is discussed extensively in Edward F. Don-
ahoe, Attorney Liability in the Preparation of Securities Disclosure Documents: Limiting Liabil-
ity in the Face of Expanded Duties, 18 Sec. Reg. L. J. 115 (1990).
39. 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988). Abell has a complicated subsequent history with respect to
its RICO holding, which was later vacated by the Supreme Court, 492 U.S. 914 (1989). For lawyer-
related holdings similar to Abell, see Friedman v. Arizona World Nurseries Ltd., 730 F. Supp. 521
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Buford White Lumber Co. v. Octagon Prop., 740 F. Supp. 1553 (W.D. Okla. 1989)
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attorneys for an underwriter in a bond offering had no duty to investors
with respect to misstatements in the prospectus, even though they were
involved actively in its preparation, purportedly did due diligence, and
were named therein. Abell limits the duty to those situations where the
lawyers provide information directly, as in an opinion letter.40 By con-
trast, other courts have found a duty based simply on the lawyer's role
as author or editor of disclosure materials.41
(3) If there is no duty, many courts eliminate recklessness as a pos-
sible liability standard.42 Others do not, so long as there is substantial
assistance given to the fraud.43 Of those insisting on a higher scienter
standard, most require a showing that the lawyer actually was aware
both of the fraud, and usually her role in it as well. An increasing num-
ber of courts, however, have indicated that in the absence of duty, it is
necessary to show high conscious intent, a criminal-law derivative that
requires proof that the lawyer desired the fraud to succeed 44 or had
(holding that there was no liability even though the attorney drafted the disclosure document,
unless the representations were the attorney's own).
40. 858 F.2d at 1125-26. This result is troubling, for when the lawyer bears such primary
responsibility for the misinformation, there is no need to invoke secondary liability. The very idea
of aiding-and-abetting liability is to reach those who only assist, rather than commit, a primary
violation. For a curious decision that seems to find attorneys who drafted the offering materials to
be primary and not secondary actors, so that reckless involvement was sufficient for liability, see
Breard v. Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd., 941 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991).
41. See, for example, Molecular Technology Corp., 925 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1991) (editing); In
re Rospatch Sec. Lit., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,939 (drafting press release and 10-K,
10-Q Forms); S.E.C. v. Electronic Warehouse Inc., 689 F. Supp. 53, 60 (D. Conn. 1988) (drafting
offering materials); Lubin v. Sybedon Corp., 688 F. Supp. 1425, 1449 (S.D. Cal. 1988) ("prepara-
tion" of offering materials). For an earlier case with an extensive discussion of attorneys' responsi-
bilities in the drafting of SEC filings, see SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968). Forced to
articulate a common-law duty, the more recent courts derived it from the tort of negligent misrep-
resentation. That is somewhat unfortunate, since the policy question involved in negligence
cases-the appropriate level of risk to impose for simple carelessness-is quite different from that
with respect to reckless misconduct. Indeed, the seminal case on common-law duty, Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 189 (1931) took pains to point out that the limited
scope of duty would offer no protection were the accountants reckless, rather than merely negli-
gent, in their conduct. A number of courts have developed a separate federal test for duty, taking
into account the defendants' relationship to the plaintiff, their access to information, the benefits
derived from the relationship with the plaintiff, the defendants' awareness of the plaintiff's reli-
ance and the defendants' activity in initiating the transaction. See Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves,
937 F.2d 1310, 1330 (8th Cir. 1991). Whether under a state or federal test, a law firm must have a
major role in the disclosure process to assume a duty. See Roberts v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &
Co., 857 F.2d 646, 653-54 (9th Cir. 1988) (limiting the law firm's role to marketability of title
inquiry).
42. The most often cited sources are HIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 923 (2d Cir. 1980) and
Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 96 (5th Cir. 1975).
43. See, for example, First Interstate Bank v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891 (10th Cir. 1992).
44. See Abell, 858 F.2d at 1127; Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991). Somewhat
troublingly, this standard is derived from the criminal law. See note 33. Even the criminal law,
however, is less than clear as to the appropriate level of intent. Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W.
Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 6.7(d) (West, 2d ed. 1986).
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otherwise "thrown in his lot"45 with the primary wrongdoers. Under
this latter formulation, extensive provision of legal services is not suffi-
cient to impose liability even if the lawyer has no doubts about the cli-
ent's wrongful purpose, so long as she exhibits no particular enthusiasm
for the consequences. This trend severely undercuts the general norm in
securities cases.
46
(4) Except in those jurisdictions that adopt the high-conscious-in-
tent locution for all aiding-and-abetting cases, a lawyer faces a threat of
liability if she knowingly, or perhaps recklessly, renders "substantial as-
sistance" to the wrongdoer. In defining substantial assistance, most
courts invoke a proximate cause construct: substantial assistance is aid
that proximately causes the victim's harm.47 Here we find a second, per-
haps more profound, winnowing doctrine. When the attorneys are not
actually responsible for preparing the communications containing the
misstatements or omissions-for instance, where they simply prepared
contracts or closing materials-there is a strong tendency to find insuf-
ficient assistance on which to impose liability. Most noteworthy in this
regard is the recent Schatz v. Rosenberg48 decision. The Baltimore law
firm of Weinberg & Green was alleged to have knowingly aided the
buyer of a business in defrauding the sellers. The client-buyer grossly
misrepresented his financial condition, leading the sellers to accept
promissory notes that later turned out to be worthless. The law firm
prepared all the necessary legal documents, and some of the misrepre-
sentations were incorporated by the firm into the contracts. In affirming
45. See Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1986). In
making that assessment, the pecuniary motivation is important, and requires something more than
the expectation of a legal fee. See also In re AM Int'l Sec. Lit., 606 F. Supp. 600, 607 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (stating that for "high conscious intent," it is not enough that an accounting firm was moti-
vated by a desire to keep the client).
46. When there is such "high conscious intent," on the other hand, some courts will dispense
with the requirement of substantial assistance and impose secondary liability based simply on si-
lence or inaction. See Pring, 969 F.2d 891; Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 624 (8th Cir. 1985);
Woodward, 522 F.2d at 95-97. Although Woodward is often cited for the high conscious intent
locution, reading the opinion in context suggests that its holding was simply meant to require a
high level of awareness (in contrast to more liberal recklessness-oriented formulations) in such
cases of inaction or silence, not when there is substantial assistance. Later in the opinion, for
instance, the court states that liability is appropriate when the facts demonstrate both "an aware-
ness of complicity and substantial assistance." Id. at 100.
47. See Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 163 (3d Cir. 1973). Whether as part of a substantial
assistance inquiry or invocation as a stand-alone requirement for Rule lOb-5 liability, many cases
have found lawyers insufficiently responsible for causing plaintiffs' losses. See, for example, First
Interstate Bank of Nevada v. Chapman & Cutler, 837 F.2d 775, 779-80 (7th Cir. 1988). In many of
these cases, the lawyers' active involvement with the client ceased before the fraud began. That by
itself is sufficient to justify the conclusion in a case like Barker. See text accompanying note 45.
48. 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991). Schatz is criticized severely in Geoffrey Hazard, Schatz
Ruling Errs on Legal, Moral Basis, Nat'l L. J. 17 (Jan. 20, 1992) (stating that its reasoning "would
embarrass a first-year law student").
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the dismissal of the action against the firm notwithstanding allegations
of knowledge, the court held that preparing the documents and doing
the closing was mere "scrivener's work," not rising to the level of sub-
stantial assistance.49
Such a conclusion is striking, for reasons beyond the suspicion that
Weinberg & Green was not charging scriveners' wages for its work. As
Ron Gilson has demonstrated, business transactions are complicated
events, confronting a host of informational asymmetries and transaction
costs.50 The lawyer who advises a client in structuring a transaction
typically operates as one side's financial engineer, developing the effi-
cient mix of contract terms, representations and warranties for the sat-
isfaction of both parties. Done artfully, this engineering readily can
maximize the client's advantage, conceal client weaknesses and avoid
contractual devices or remedies that might thwart any fraud.51 Law
firms frequently utilize their reputational capital to overcome lingering
suspicions by opposing parties. It is thus too quick to say that lawyers
are not a proximate cause of a tainted transaction simply because their
role was limited to advice and drafting.
Similarly, a number of courts have stated that when lawyers' ser-
vices simply represent "the grist of the mill" in business settings, then
liability will not follow without a showing of the highest version of con-
scious intent-a desire to make the fraud succeed.52 They then place a
large number of standard legal services in the grist category and outside
49. Schatz, 943 F.2d at 495. As a separate matter, the court also found plaintiffs' allegations
of knowledge insufficient for failing to provide factual support for a desire to aid the fraud. Id.
50. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation By Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing,
94 Yale L. J. 239 (1984).
51. The precise role played by Weinberg & Green is not set forth in the Schatz appellate
opinion, although the complaint did allege some facts that hint the firm acted as financial engi-
neers: for example, the lawyers negotiated language regarding the nature of the buyer's representa-
tions to the sellers about its financial condition.
52. See, for example, Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455 (8th Cir. 1991). Presumably, many courts
would not place involvement in the preparation of the disclosure materials themselves in the high
conscious intent category. In Abell, however, the Fifth Circuit treated the lawyers' involvement in
the preparation of disclosure materials for a bond offering as grist, so justifying the high standard
of intent. 858 F.2d at 1128. Compare Kilmartin v. Wainwright, 580 F. Supp. 604, 608 (D. Mass.
1984), as well as the cases finding a duty based on such involvement, cited in notes 38, 40. The
SEC plainly considers drafting assistance to be substantial assistance, and has sanctioned lawyers
for their roles in client misrepresentation and nondisclosure. See, for example, Mark Sauter, [Cur-
rent] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,860 (Aug. 4, 1992) (Rule 2(e) proceeding against inside counsel).
The grist terminology traces back to Woodward. There was no indication, however, that involve-
ment in a highly sensitive setting like the preparation of a securities offering prospectus would be
considered mere grist. Underlying the grist idea may be the concept of proximate cause: were the
attorney to withhold some simple, routine service, then the primary wrongdoer would simply look
elsewhere for a less honest provider. For a view that the intentional provision of even simple ser-
vices to a wrongdoer should not be protected on this ground, see Kahn v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
760 F. Supp. 369, 374-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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the definition of substantial assistance. This distinction reserves the la-
bel of unusual for cases in which the lawyer actively solicits the transac-
tion or otherwise has a pecuniary interest in it beyond the expectation
of a legal fee.'3 To this extent, the power of the general norm can disap-




At one time, the liability of professionals who negligently provided
false information in the course of their duties was limited by the notion
of privity. Ever since Judge Cardozo's famous decision in Ultramares v.
Touche Niven & Co., 55 involving accountants' liability, however, privity
has diminished in significance. Most of the recent decisions involving
lawyers' alleged negligence leave at least some room for liability to non-
clients. The bulk of the law in this area involves the issuance of opinion
letters, facilitating some transaction, that rest on misinformation sup-
plied by the client. 8
Just how much privity has eroded depends on the jurisdiction. The
question is one of economics, for an expanded scope of liability adds
verification, precaution and risk premium costs to the lawyer-client
contract.57 Many courts have moved just a little, requiring a showing
that the lawyer was directed by the client to prepare the information
53. A notable counterpoint to this line is In re Rospatch Sec. Lit., [Current] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 96,939 (W.D. Mich. July 8, 1992), where the court refused to characterize a law
firm's involvement as grist when it had over 50 active accounts with the same client, and one
partner was also a director of the client.
54. After cases like Schatz, Abell and Barker, it may be that the most notorious of the law-
yers' aiding-and-abetting cases-SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682
(D.D.C. 1978)-is becoming something of an anachronism. There, the court found the lawyers re-
sponsible for failing to take action to stop the closing of a merger once they understood that share-
holder approval had been obtained on the basis of false financial data in the proxy materials. The
National Student Marketing court's discussion of substantial assistance and duty to the client is
murky at best, and appears to run counter to the more recent appellate decisions. As to knowledge,
there was no evidence at all that the attorneys desired to facilitate the fraud. Compare the SEC's
discussion of aiding-and-abetting liability in the Carter and Johnson 2(e) proceeding, in which the
Commission found no willful aiding and abetting with respect to silence or inaction in the face of
rather egregious client behavior when the lawyers were simply "at a loss for how to deal with a
difficult client." [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 84,169.
55. 255 N.Y. 170 (1931).
56. For good reviews of the relevant case law, see Donahoe, 18 Sec. Reg. L. J. 115 (cited in
note 38); Steinberg, Corporate and Securities Malpractice at 1.4.2 (cited in note 15); Haft, Liabil-
ity of Attorneys at ch. 5 (cited in note 15); Freeman, 1989 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 235 (cited in note
31). See also Richard Howe, The Duties and Liabilities of Attorneys in Rendering Legal Opinions,
1989 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 283.
57. See William Bishop, Negligent Misrepresentation Through Economists' Eyes, 96 L. Q.
Rev. 360 (1980). As Part III of my Article seeks to demonstrate, however, the perception of risk
associated with any given representation is likely to be distorted.
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for the benefit of an identifiable third party before a duty to that non-
client arises. 8 Others expand the group of persons to whom the duty is
owed to those whose reliance the lawyer, at the client's direction, in-
tends to influence, or perhaps even to all those forseeably influenced by
the information. 9
However this duty is defined, it attaches only when the lawyer
bears responsibility for preparing the information alleged to be fraudu-
lent. Precisely how much responsibility is unclear. As in the aiding-and-
abetting cases, some courts have emphasized the visibility of the law-
yer's involvement, suggesting that liability follows when a reasonable
investor would believe that the disclosures bear the lawyer's imprima-
tur.60 Others suggest, less persuasively, that behind-the-scenes drafting
responsibility will suffice."
The most intriguing question in the law of negligent misrepresenta-
tion relates to the lawyer's duty of investigation, or due diligence. If
suspicions are raised with respect to client-supplied information, the
lawyer must inquire. But there is little authority for the view that law-
yers have an automatic obligation to investigate client-supplied infor-
mation,61 except in those situations in which the disclosure strongly
58. See Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 1991) (involving lawyers); Vereins-
Und Westbank, A.G. v. Carter, 691 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (same); Credit Alliance Corp. v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 493 N.Y.S.2d 435 (N.Y. 1985) (involving accountants).
59. There are a variety of formulations that go beyond near-privity. The Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts § 552 (1977) uses a standard that creates a duty to third parties who are part of a
limited group of persons whom the lawyer intends to influence. See Greycas v. Proud, 826 F.2d
1560, 1565 (7th Cir. 1987) (applying a similar standard under Illinois law); Eisenberg v. Gagnon,
766 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1985). Other states go further, making foreseeability or other policy-based
concerns the test. See, for example, Zendell v. Newport Oil Corp., 544 A.2d 878 (N.J. Super. 1988).
California has applied a very open-ended balancing approach, which has not met with great favor
in other jurisdictions. See, for example, Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal.3d 335 (1976); Cicone v. URS
Corp., 227 Cal. Rptr. 887 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). In a recent decision involving accountants' liability,
the California Supreme Court indicated that a far more restrictive posture is likely. Bily v. Arthur
Young & Co., 3 Cal.4th 370 (Cal. 1992).
60. In other words, there must be evidence that the lawyers themselves were "speaking." See,
for example, Buford White Lumber Co. v. Octagon Properties, 740 F. Supp. 1553, 1570 (W.D.
Okla. 1989).
61. See notes 39-41; Donahoe, 18 Sec. Reg. L. J. at 127 & n.57 (cited in note 38). Once again,
to avoid confusing questions of primary and secondary liability, the key question should be
whether investors are given some reason to rely on the special expertise or reputation of the pre-
paring lawyers. See, for example, Morin v. Trupin, 711 F. Supp. 97, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Andreo v.
Friedlander, Gaines, Cohen, Rosenthal & Rosenberg, 660 F. Supp. 1362 (D. Conn. 1987) (Rule
10b-5). If the attorney is retained to perform a limited service, the duty will apply only to matters
within the scope of the retention. See Geaslen v. Berkson Gorov & Levin, 581 N.E.2d 138 (Ill. Ct.
App. 1991).
62. For cases suggesting such a duty of inquiry, see F.D.LC. v. O'Melveny & Myers, 969 F.2d
744 (9th Cir. 1992) (involving duty to the client; there is indication, however, that firm was on
notice of wrongdoing); Felts v. Nat'l Account Systems Assn., Inc., 469 F. Supp. 54, 67 (N.D. Miss.
1978). The strongest rejection of the duty to investigate is Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d
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indicates to the nQnclient that the lawyer had assumed a verifying
role." The lawyer can limit due diligence exposure through disclosure
of limited knowledge, making this a relatively mild form of gatekeeping
liability.
64
2. Duty to the Client
A relatively novel form of negligence-based liability exposure is il-
lustrated by the F.D.I.C. v. O'Melveny & Myers" decision. There, the
court of appeals held the law firm could be found liable for not discov-
ering the falsity of information that dishonest bank managers had sup-
plied the firm in the course of preparing offering materials for securities
disclosure purposes. Investors already had succeeded in obtaining re-
scission,66 and the FDIC, as receiver, was seeking to shift a portion of
the loss to the firm on grounds that the firm's lack of due diligence was
a proximate cause of the harm.
806, 808 (Utah 1974). See also ABA Formal Op. 335 (1974) (indicating that a lawyer is not ex-
pected to "audit" client-supplied information with respect to determining the availiability of a
Securities Act exemption for a distribution of securities). Another line of cases imposes a duty on
real estate brokers to investigate facts supplied by the client that assume central importance in a
transaction. See Tennant v. Lawton, 615 P.2d 1305, 1309 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980); Hoffman v. Con-
nail, 736 P.2d 242 (Wash. 1987). Compare Provost v. Miller, 473 A.2d 1162 (Vt. 1984) (finding no
such duty).
63. Although no court has so articulated, determining whether the disclosure suggests verifi-
cation should be a matter of the reasonable expectations created: it is an issue of signalling. A
number of social scientists have observed that the simple association of a reputable person with
another in a transactional setting creates a halo, leading people to place more trust in that other
person. Wittingly or not, therefore, such associations can facilitate fraud. See Stanton Wheeler and
Mitchell Lewis Rothman, The Organization as Weapon in White-Collar Crime, 80 Mich. L. Rev.
1403 (1982); Gandossy, Bad Business at 207-09 (cited in note 5). A law firm named in a prospectus
or offering circular as having prepared the disclosures, or making oral representations on behalf of
a client, probably will add to the impression that the information is accurate. It would not be
foolish for the law to impose on the lawyer who has assumed such a role a duty to investigate key
facts and assumptions unless the disclosure effectively negated that expectation. To date, however,
the law has not clearly articulated such a position, probably on the haughty assumption that ra-
tional people are not misled by mere associations.
64. Were the law to presume attorneys responsible for the preparation of documents in
which they are named, this presumption would be overcome simply by including a disclaimer in
the materials at some appropriate level of visibility. The methods of negating unintended expecta-
tions are discussed thoroughly in Donahoe, 13 Sec. Reg. L. J. at 129, 136-37 (cited in note 38). Less
reducible through disclosure, and far more unlikely is the risk under the securities laws that the
lawyer or law firm could be treated as a controlling person of the primary wrongdoer. Pursuant to
Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, controlling persons can be held liable unless they
could show good faith and lack of knowledge, which many courts equate with reasonable supervi-
sion. For a case raising the possibility that a law firm be considered a controlling person, see In re
Rospatch Sec. Lit., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 96,939 (W.D. Mich. July 8, 1992). Another
negligence-based form of liability exposure may be found under certain state blue sky laws. See
Douglas M. Branson, Collateral Participant Liability Under State Securities Laws, 19 Pepperdine
L. Rev. 1027 (1992).
65. 969 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992).
66. The FDIC, as receiver, initiated the rescission program, and took in return an assignment
of their causes of action. Id. at 747.
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How wide the exposure created by an O'Melveny theory is not
clear. There were special facts that arguably placed the firm on notice
of management dishonesty, triggering in the court's mind a duty of vigi-
lance. On the other hand, there is also a good bit in the opinion that
points to a general duty .of inquiry regarding client-supplied informa-
tion in transactional settings. As between attorney and client, however,
the level of diligence required in the preparation of disclosure is implic-
itly a matter of contract. Absent express definition or limitation, the
court must imply the missing term. When an independent legal obliga-
.tion or some observable custom in the legal community requires the
client to obtain due diligence, and thus verify management-supplied
data, 7 there is reason to assume that the parties intend attorney due
diligence in a way that precludes reliance on management's representa-
tions. Otherwise not. Management is the most efficient provider of the
information, and verification is costly. We can predict that to the extent
that O'Melveny alters the implied contract as lawyers and clients nor-
mally understand it, more specific risk-allocation language will appear
in attorney-client agreements." Once again the contractual nature of
the problem suggests that it is unlikely to operate as a strong gatekeep-
ing norm except in highly specialized circumstances.
C. Pleading and Proof
The foregoing liability strategies employ differing state of mind
standards. Even within the knowledge constructs, there are variations
based on recklessness, actual awareness and motivated intent. Within
negligence, there is a gray area between reactive and proactive duties.
To a factfinder during a trial, however, the various state of mind pos-
sibilities will blend together. Absent confession or some incriminating
documentation or testimony regarding knowledge, the factfinder will
look at the evidence circumstantially. How vivid the fraud warnings ap-
67. The court in O'Melveny suggested that such custom existed, although the principal au-
thority related to the preparation of opinion letters, rather than documentation going out under
the client's name. 969 F.2d at 749. On the process of gap-filling, which most scholars assume is the
process of structuring incentives to minimize transaction and information costs, see, for example,
David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89
Mich. L. Rev. 1815 (1991).
68. O'Melveny also may be of limited relevance in that it held, using federal estoppel law,
that the FDIC was not precluded from bringing suit against the law firm even though the bank's
own management was the primary wrongdoer. Although the court indicated that the result might
be the same under state law, that is dicta. In the cases in which the wrongdoers perpetrated a
fraud on third parties primarily in order to benefit the company and not themselves, their knowl-
edge may be attributed to the company, possibly precluding a claim of breach against the attor-
neys. See FDIC v. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding that the FDIC was
estopped where management made fraudulent bookkeeping entries to benefit the bank).
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pear will lead it to infer whether the lawyer must have known (knowl-
edge or awareness), 69 deliberately ignored (subjective recklessness) or
should have known (a range from objective recklessness to simple negli-
gence) of the fraud. Such inference is likely to be imprecise, the product
of trial strategy as much as historic fact.70
The far greater bite to the variations in state of mind standards
comes at the pretrial stage. Plaintiffs' actions against lawyers often are
dismissed, at least in cases under the securities laws that require a
showing of actual knowledge, if they can do no more than allege that
the attorneys' involvement with the client was such that they "must
have known" of the fraud.7 1 More liberal forms of scienter pleading,
allowed against a company's control group through inference by associ-
ation, do not extend to the company's attorneys.72 In those courts that
insist on a higher state of mind standard, successful pleading is nearly
impossible. In contrast, lesser standards like negligence and reckless-
ness permit far greater latitude in inferential pleading.
73
The effect of higher state of mind requirements is to bias the law
considerably against straight substantial assistance claims against law-
yers, especially under the securities laws. When the lawyer is involved
in the disclosure process the potential for negligent misrepresentation
liability arises.7 4 Under Rule 10b-5, that same common-law duty of care
can become the basis in some jurisdictions for aiding-and-abetting lia-
bility based on recklessness. Without such involvement, however, the
higher state of mind standards apply. It is rare that a plaintiff at the
pleadings stage will have access to evidence that creates more than an
inferential claim against the lawyers, unless some prior SEC investiga-
69. The courts in many settings, including aiding-and-abetting cases brought under the se-
curities laws, have made clear that the fact finder may infer knowledge from circumstantial evi-
dence, including evidence of recklessness. See, for example, Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84,
96 (5th Cir. 1975). One of the most frequently cited illustrations regarding a lawyer's involvement
in client misconduct is United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 861-62 (2d Cir. 1964).
70. See text accompanying notes 138-40.
71. This rule was articulated most firmly in Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt,
797 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1986). For a discussion of dismissals on the pleadings, see Feldman, 19 Sec.
Reg. L. J. at 54-55 (cited in note 35); Haft, Liability of Attorneys § 3.06 (cited in note 5). Closely
related as a preclusive device is the motion for summary judgment. See, for example, Ockerman v.
May Zima & Co., 785 F. Supp. 695 (M.D. Tenn. 1992).
72. See In re Citisource, Inc. Sec. Lit., 694 F. Supp. 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). Compare Wool v.
Tandem Computers Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1440 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that controlling officers'
knowledge could be inferred based upon the assumption that misstatements were their collective
product).
73. See Rudolph v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 800 F.2d 1040, 1045-46 (11th Cir. 1986). Inter-
esting in this regard is Breard v. Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd., 941 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991), upholding
a complaint against a law firm that drafted offering materials because a strong inference of fraud
could be made given the nature of the misrepresentations.
74. See text accompanying notes 55-61.
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tion or journalistic expos6 has uncovered tangible evidence of con-
sciously wrongful activity. This means that some unknown number of
claims that presumably would succeed if allowed to go to discovery and
trial are eliminated at the pleadings stage.
D. An Assessment
The standards of attorney liability as applied explain in part the
observations of attorney inaction in the face of client fraud. A variety of
doctrinal twists and pleadings traps, most visible in the securities cases,
make it far less than likely that attorneys who simply give business
planning assistance to a miscreant client will be exposed to liability.
Even when the attorney becomes actively involved in fraudulent disclo-
sure, which creates a far greater potential exposure under both federal
and state law, there are some well-known decisions like Abell or Barker
v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt7 5 that send offsetting messages
of comfort to the community of lawyers. Together with the well-publi-
cized efforts of the bar in favor of client loyalty and against
whistleblowing, the tone of such holdings readily can create the misim-
pression that continued involvement with a wrongdoing client is ethi-
cally acceptable, perhaps even laudable.7 6 To lawyers predisposed by
economic incentive to desire that message, it may be powerful support.
It is doubtful, however, that this explanation is a complete one.
From the ex ante perspective of the lawyer who either knows of or sus-
pects client wrongdoing, the exposure is still palpable. There are the
risks of an SEC investigation, of state law actions unrestrained by some
of the doctrinal developments under Rule 10b-5, of reputational dam-
age even in unsuccessful claims. Therefore, we should continue to look
for other explanations.
75. 797 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1986). The court's remark that "[w]e are satisfied.. that an award
of damages under the securities laws is not the way to blaze the trail toward improved ethical
standards [in the legal profession,]" id. at 497, is often quoted. Barker's comfort is more in the
language of the opinion than the actual holding, since the attorney's role in the fraud in that case
was quite remote, ceasing before the fraud took place.
76. Professor Hazard has observed that in the aftermath of the final adoption of the Model
Rules, some attorneys misperceived it as a vindication of the lawyers who had assisted OPM (see
text accompanying notes 128-34) in its fraud. Hazard, 33 Emory L. J. at 306 (cited in note 19). The
tendency of the ABA's nomos of strong client loyalty to trump weak or ambiguous legal norms to
the contrary is noted in Koniak, 70 N.C. L. Rev. at 1461-69 (cited in note 10).
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III. LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND SOCIAL COGNITION
Nothing is easier than self-deceit.
For what each man wishes, that he also believes to be true.
Demosthenes, Third Olynthiac, sec. 19
Financial fraud is an exercise in the manipulation of abstractions.
Sellers of assets seeking buyers who will pay too much, or less fre-
quently, buyers trying to appropriate assets at an unduly low price will
try to structure a setting in which the truth is hidden in a dense puzzle.
The seller hopes that the other party's hope or greed will trump
thoughtful inquiry.
77
Typically, clients creating such fraud do not involve their lawyers
directly in the wrongdoing. More commonly, they seek to deceive them
as well. Sometimes they succeed, in a way that leads us to conclude that
the attorney bears neither moral nor legal responsibility for the harm.
This is especially likely when responsibility for a project is so diffused
that neither the lawyer nor anyone else but the primary wrongdoer has
the ability to put the puzzle pieces together. But in many cases, the
stories told afterward make us wonder how the lawyers could be so gul-
lible or mindless to have missed the abundant signals of misbehavior.
The claim that they were duped loses credibility in light of these sig-
nals, reinforcing the venality hypothesis.
There is reason to believe, however, that in a noisy world of compli-
cated abstractions an involved actor has a diminished capacity to per-
ceive danger signals that might indicate fraud. If so, traditional liability
strategies, both intent- and notice-based, will operate with severely re-
duced efficacy. 8 In addition, we have the possibility that a portion of
the observed incidence of lawyer complicity in financial fraud may be
instances in which the attorneys are acting innocently, without suffi-
cient cognitive awareness of the harmful consequences of their actions.
The scholarly literature that offers the most useful insights into the
mindsets of lawyers whose clients are involved in fraud comes from the
branch of psychology dealing with social cognition, 9 the intersection
77. For an intriguing account of the role of hope and mindlessness in investment decisions in
the context of purchasing biotechnology stocks, see Robert Teitelman, Gene Dreams: Wall Street,
Academia, and the Rise of Biotechnology (Basic Books, 1989).
78. This is separate from the related question of whether a lawyer who is aware of the impro-
priety is likely to assess the risk of detection or sanction accurately. For a discussion of the social
cognition literature on this question, see Jeff Casey and John Scholtz, Beyond Deterrence: Behav-
ioral Decision Theory and Tax Compliance, 25 L. & Soc'y Rev. 821 (1991).
79. For useful overviews of the voluminous research in this field, see Susan T. Fiske and
Shelley E. Taylor, Social Cognition (McGraw-Hill, 2d ed. 1991); Elliot Aronson, The Social
Animal 115-240 (W. H. Freeman, 6th ed. 1992); Hazel Markus and R. B. Zajonic, The Cognitive
Perspective in Social Psychology, in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, eds., 1 Handbook of
Social Psychology 137 (Random House, 3d ed. 1985).
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between the traditionally separate disciplines of social and cognitive
psychology. For our purposes, it must be used somewhat gingerly. Like
most social scientists, social cognitivists' findings have been generated
largely by laboratory experiments, under pragmatic limitations and re-
search protocols that make it hard to replicate the richness of everyday
life.80 Efforts to theorize beget endless criticism. Social cognition is an
intellectually young field, with palpable divisions among its best-known
theorists that make it difficult to find points of consensus to import
readily into legal analysis. Still, the field is most tempting to legal aca-
demics because, like the economics literature a decade or two ago, it
offers unexpected insights into well-worn habits of legal thinking. To
those intrigued by the foibles, frustrations and ineffiencies of human
behavior, it provides support and explanation.8' Not surprisingly, then,
social cognition research has begun to inform work by well-known
scholars in torts,82 criminal law, 3 contracts,84 corporate law, 5 and pol-
80. See Robin M. Hogarth, Beyond Discrete Biases: Functional and Dysfunctional Aspects
of Judgmental Heuristics, 90 Psych. Bull. 197 (1981). On the methodology of the social sciences
and the relationship to positive law, see David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the
Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 Emory L. J. 1005 (1989) (noting the
long distance from the laboratory to real life). The psychological literature operates as a threat to
some of the underlying assumptions of economics in particular, although there is no doubt that
market and institutional forces can offset these biases in many instances. For a rich and thoughtful
set of articles on this confrontation, see Robin M. Hogarth and Melvin W. Reder, eds., The Behav-
ioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 59 J. Bus. S181 (1986). For a formal effort at integration,
see George A. Akerlof and William T. Dickens, The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Disso-
nance, 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 307 (1982). Some experimental evidence on the limited ability of mar-
kets to filter biases is found in Colin Camerer, The Rationality of Prices and Volume in
Experimental Markets, 51 Org. Behav. & Hum. Dec. Processes 237 (1992).
81. The strongest call for the use of this literature generally is Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing
Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65
Chi. Kent L. Rev. 23 (1989). A helpful introduction to the cognitive illusions phase of social cogni-
tion is Ward Edwards and Detlof von Winterfeldt, Cognitive Illusions and Their Implications for
the Law, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 225 (1986).
82. See, for example, Howard A. Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Lia-
bility, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 677, 682-85 (1985). For a cautionary note, see Paul J. Heald and James E.
Heald, Mindlessness and the Law, 77 Va. L. Rev. 1127 (1991) (emphasizing that even mindless
behavior may be adaptive to legal standards).
83. See, for example, Leo Katz, Bad Acts and Guilty Minds: Conundrums of the Criminal
Law (Chi., 1987); Ronald L. Akers, Rational Choice, Deterrence and Social Learning Theory in
Criminology: The Path Not Taken, 81 J. Crim. L. & Criminol. 653 (1990). From the economics
literature, see William Dickens, Crime and Punishment Again: The Economics Approach with a
Psychological Twist, 30 J. Pub. Econ. 97 (1986).
84. See, for example, William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need
for Mortgage Rules Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale
and Loan Transaction, 70 Va. L. Rev. 1083, 1112-18 (1984). Compare Randy E. Barnett, The
Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 Va. L. Rev. 821, 877-88 (1992) (dis-
cussing consciousness in contract formation).
85. See, for example, James D. Cox and Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psy-
chological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 L. & Contemp. Probs.
83 (1985). On securities law, see Donald Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions and Securities Regu-
19931 CLIENT FRAUD
icy analysis.8
Social cognition is the process by which people acquire informa-
tion, beliefs and attitudes about themselves and others. Psychologists
presume that individuals engage in subjective construals-that the
lenses through which they perceive people and events produce pictures
heavily affected, and sometimes distorted, by both cognitive and moti-
vational influences.87 A lawyer's ability to spot client misconduct, they
would argue, can be evaluated only in light of those influences.
To begin this review, we should note that most of the mental
processes of social cognition are understood to operate out of conscious-
ness. The label "preconscious" often is applied, meaning mental activity
of which the person is not aware, but can come to understand later
upon proper prompting.88 Cognitive biases often take cover under what
the subject firmly believes is rational thinking.8 9 Professional hubris
aside, there is no reason to think that lawyers are any less susceptible
to such self-deception than others. Indeed, serious biases have been
identified regularly in the work of many other elite professions whose
tasks are highly inferential.90
lation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 851, 857-61 (1992).
86. See Roger G. Noll and James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for
Risk Regulation, 19 J. Legal Stud. 747 (1990).
87. See, for example, Aronson, The Social Animal at 115-240 (cited in note 79).
88. See Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, Decision-Making: A Psychological Analysis of Con-
flict, Choice and Commitment 95-96 (Free Press, 1977); Fiske and Taylor, Social Cognition at 228
(cited in note 79). See also Phillip Zimbardo and Michael Lieppe, The Psychology of Attitude
Change and Social Influence 245-46 (Temple, 1991). On self-deception, see Ruben C. Gur and
Harold A. Sackeim, Self-Deception: A Concept in Search of a Phenomenon, 37 J. Person. & Soc.
Psych. 147 (1979). But see Albert Bandura, Social Cognitive Theory of Moral Thought and Ac-
tion, in William M. Kurtines and Jacob L. Gewirtz, eds., 1 Handbook of Moral Behavior and
Development 45, 95 (Lawrence Erlbaum, 1991) (criticizing the idea of self-deception as contradic-
tory). Of course, people sometimes seek to manipulate external impressions regarding matters of
fault and blame in a very conscious fashion, making it hard to assess the consciousness of wrongdo-
ing. See Philip E. Tetlock, Toward an Intuitive Politician Model of Attribution Processes, in
Barry R. Schlenker, ed., The Self and Social Life 203, 218-24 (McGraw-Hill, 1985). Even self-
presentational theories acknowledge the likelihood that thought processes are often subconscious
or preconscious. See, for example, Roy F. Baumeister, A Self-Presentational View of Social Phe-
nomena, 91 Psych. Bull. 3, 3 (1982).
89. See Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 Psych. Bull. 480, 482-83 (1990).
90. Surprisingly, there has not been a significant body of social psychological research into
lawyer decisionmaking. Deborah Rhode has invoked it in a number of respects relating to legal
ethics. See Rhode, 42 J. Legal Educ. at 44-48 (cited in note 16); Rhode, 37 Stan. L. Rev. at 629
(cited in note 13). See also Mary Twitchell, The Ethical Dilemmas of Lawyers on Teams, 72 Minn.
L. Rev. 697 (1988) (commenting on group dynamics). There is some sociological work that explores
attitudes and influences. See Robert L. Nelson, Partners With Power: The Social Transformation
of the Large Law Firm (Cal. 1987) (documenting the tendency of corporate lawyers to form atti-
tudes consonant with client interests); Jeffrey S. Slovak, The Ethics of Corporate Lawyers: A Soci-
ological Approach, 1981 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 753. In contrast, the behavioral influences on
auditor conduct is a widely studied phenomenon presumably because of the more standardized
nature of auditing activities. See Robin M. Hogarth, A Perspective on Cognitive Research in Ac-
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A. Beginning the Representation: Constructing a Schema
Central to the field of social cognition is the schema: a person's
mental representation of a set of stimuli.91 As a lawyer begins repre-
senting a client in a transactional project, she constructs a schema that
provides a general understanding of the people involved and their goals,
and so orients her action. As in most social settings, the amount of defi-
nite information that can be used in drawing this cognitive map is at
the outset quite limited, and many of the stimuli are ambiguous. As a
result, the mind uses a variety of heuristic devices to fine-tune the ini-
tially fuzzy picture. It notes resemblances to prior encounters and oc-
currences, and extrapolates from readily observable characteristics of
the actors or the situation. The strongest influence in schema forma-
tion, however, is likely to be the process of social learning:9 2 taking cues
from those apparently more familiar with the situation, and conforming
to their beliefs and attitudes.
Although it is by no means inevitable, the business lawyer with a
new client probably will build a fairly positive schema. Observing no
immediate danger signs, perhaps initially impressed with the success-
characteristics of the personalities involved,9 3 and seeing other profes-
sionals already dealing with the client on an ostensibly normal and rou-
tine basis, she is entitled to invoke the mental shortcuts that produce
an optimistic assessment.9 4 Further, she may be motivated to do so.
counting, 66 Acct. Rev. 277 (1991). Much work has focused on the role of expertise in decisionmak-
ing as well. Although experts do think differently when confronted with tasks, many researchers
are pessimistic that expertise leads to the wholesale elimination of biases. See, for example, Ward
Edwards, Unfinished Tasks: A Research Agenda for Behavioral Decision Theory, in Robin M.
Hogarth, ed., Insights in Decision Making: A Tribute to Hillel J. Einhorn 44, 50 (Chi., 1990). A
fair amount of research has focused on the suboptimal decisions made by physicians and clinical
psychologists. For example, David M. Eddy, Probabilistic Reasoning in Clinical Medicine:
Problems and Opportunities, in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky, Judgment
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 249 (Cambridge, 1982).
91. See Fiske and Taylor, Social Cognition at 98 (cited in note 79); Hazel Markus, Self-
Schemata and Processing Information About the Self, 35 J. Pers. & Soc. Psych. 63 (1977).
92. See, for example, Albert Bandura, Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social
Cognitive Theory 47 (Prentice-Hall, 1986); Robert B. Cialdini, Influence: Science and Practice 108
(Scott, Foresman, 2d ed. 1987). Social learning is adaptive in the sense that absent better evidence,
the behavior of others may be the best available information set.
93. The early stages of schema construction use highly stereotypical shortcuts in the forma-
tion of impressions. Appearance, salient bits of information about the past and other relatively
unreliable evidence is overweighted, and a "halo" leads the observer to extrapolate these few posi-
tive impressions to a full tentative attitude toward the person or the situation. See, for example,
Fiske and Taylor, Social Cognition at 142-47; Aronson, Social Animal at 136-37 (cited in note 79).
94. Unreasonable optimism is a common characteristic, leading people to overweight the like-
lihood of successful future outcomes, and underweight the likelihood of failure. See sources cited in
Fiske and Taylor, Social Cognition at 215. People also tend to have an excessively inflated percep-
tion of how others perceive them, id. at 214, and a tendency to take personal credit for successes,
while attributing failures to external situational factors.
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Laboratory studies indicate that people whose success depends on the
efforts of others have a strong tendency to form positive impressions of
those on whom they depend. 5
We should pause here to confront the skeptical reader's likely ob-
jection. Much of the literature in social cognition focuses, perhaps ex-
cessively, on cognitive "imperfections."96 This sometimes creates the
impression that those who trust these often unreliable mental shortcuts
are inferior, unlikely to thrive in a competitive marketplace. What
makes us think that successful lawyers could afford to think in such an
unreliable fashion?
There are two important answers. The first is necessity. Attorneys
are confronted with immense amounts of intellectual stimuli each day
and must implicitly or explicitly make thousands of decisions and judg-
ments through inductive reasoning. Without an internal management
information system filled with preconscious filters and shortcuts, life
would be unbearably chaotic.9 7 The other is adaptation. Heuristics are
adaptive so long as they work much of the time and no more efficient
alternative is available."' In normal life, these rough judgments and
rules of thumb work quite acceptably with relative frequency; more pre-
cise mechanisms, such as Bayesian analyses with full attention to base
rates and other statistical properties, simply are not practicable. Feed-
back is not sufficiently repetitious and unambiguous to allow for more
effective learning.9 9 Moreover, many kinds of cognitive illusions are cu-
95. See Steven L. Neuberg and Susan T. Fiske, Motivational Influences on Impression For-
mation: Outcome Dependency, Accuracy-Driven Attention, and Individuating Processes, 53 J.
Pers. & Soc. Psych. 431 (1987); Kunda, 108 Psych. Bull. at 486-87 (cited in note 89).
96. It has been said that "two plus two equals four is arithmetic; two plus two equals five is
psychology." Kenneth R. Hammond, Functionalism and Illusionism: Can Integration Be Usefully
Achieved?, in Hogarth, ed., Insights in Decision Making at 227, 237 (cited in note 90). A good
overview of the competing viewpoints is Helmut Jungermann, The Two Camps on Rationality, in
Hal R. Arkes and Kenneth R. Hammond, eds., Judgment and Decision Making: An Interdiscipli-
nary Reader 627 (Cambridge, 1986). The tendency of the literature to overweight findings of im-
perfections is noted in Jay J. J. Christiansen-Szalanski and Lee Roy Beach, The Citation Bias:
Fad and Fashion in the Judgment and Decision Literature, 39 Am. Psych. 75 (1984).
97. See Keith J. Holyoak and Richard E. Nisbett, Induction, in Robert J. Sternberg and
Edward E. Smith, eds., The Psychology of Human Thought 50, 55 (Cambridge, 1988). See also
Anthony G. Greenwald, The Totalitarian Ego: Fabrication and Revision of Personal History, 35
Am. Psych. 603, 612-13 (1980); Fiske and Taylor, Social Cognition at 91 (cited in note 79). For an
insightful lawyer-oriented essay on the adaptive quality of "suboptimal" thought, see Robert E.
Scott, Error and Rationality in Individual Decisionmaking: An Essay on the Relationship Be-
tween Cognitive Illusions and the Management of Choices, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 329 (1986).
98. See, for example, Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and
Shortcomings of Social Judgment 254-55 (Prentice-Hall, 1981).
99. As noted earlier, human learning can overcome some of the biases that are particularly
noticeable in laboratory experiments involving "one shot" cognitive tests. See text accompanying
note 80. However, a number of psychologists have concluded that for feedback to work, it must be
unambiguous and, unless particularly salient, repeated. See, for example, Baruch Fischhoff, Judg-
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riously functional. Excessive optimism and the illusion of control, 100 for
instance, are associated with physiological well-being, and may cause
persons to assume greater risks and to be more persistent than "real-
ists."'10 The illusion can thus become a self-fulfilling prophecy as a
greater number of successful outcomes are generated, even if by chance,
in turn leading to further expectations of success in the person's self-
schema and the dispositional attributions of others. 10 2 The relationship
among ego, self-esteem and lawyer behavior is something to which we
shall return shortly.
B. Schema Evolution: The Process of Representation
As the client representation continues, new information bits relat-
ing to the situation will confront a lawyer regularly. These will cause
the schema to become more complex and well-developed, and under the
right circumstances disconfirming evidence will cause a noticeable
change in impression. But if there is general agreement about any con-
cept in social cognition, it is that of cognitive conservatism.103 The
ment and Decision Making, in Sternberg and Smith, eds., Psychology of Human Thought at 153,
172 (cited in note 97); Berndt Brehmer, In One Word: Not From Experience, in Arkes and Ham-
mond, eds., Judgment and Decision Making at 705, 714-16 (cited in note 96). For an intriguing
laboratory study confirming the importance of unambiguity and repetition, see Colin F. Camerer,
Behavioral Game Theory, in Hogarth, ed., Insights in Decision Making at 311 (cited in note 90)
(showing that learning optimal strategies in a lending "game" took several iterations with fairly
discrete feedback). It is likely that lawyers operate in environments rarely characterized by unam-
biguous feedback.
100. See Ellen J. Langer, The Illusion of Control, 32 J. Pers. & Soc. Psych. 311 (1975). The
illusion of control is the well-documented tendency of people to believe that their personal involve-
ment in a situation makes the desired outcome more likely, even if there is in fact no necessary
relationship between involvement and outcome.
101. With such a cognitive structure, positive outcomes will seem more probative in the de-
velopment of self-concept, and the sense of control and optimism will grow. So long as egotistical
behavior does not become self-destructive, it is likely to lead to further success through persever-
ance and greater risk-taking. The illusions of control and self-worth generally are absent in de-
pressed people. See, for example, Albert Bandura, Social Foundations at 224-25 (cited in note 92).
102. On the role of the expectations of others in self-fulfilling prophecies, see Lee Ross and
Richard E. Nisbett, The Person and the Situation: Perspectives of Social Psychology 154-58, 227-
28 (Temple, 1991); Mark Snyder, When Belief Creates Reality, in Leonard Berkowitz, ed., 18 Ad-
vances in Experimental Social Psychology 247 (Acad., 1984).
103. See, for example, Fiske and Taylor, Social Cognition at 13, 149-51 (cited in note 79)
(characterizing people as "cognitive misers"); Nisbett and Ross, Human Inference at 167 (cited in
note 98). Elliot Aronson refers to the process of cognitive conservatism as the tendency to "pre-
serve that which is already established-to maintain our preexisting knowledge, beliefs, attitudes
and hypotheses." Aronson, Social Animal at 148 (cited in note 79). Some of the classic experi-
ments on belief perseverance are Craig A. Anderson, Mark R. Lepper and Lee Ross, Perseverance
of Social Theories: The Role of Explanation in the Persistence of Discredited Information, 39 J.
Pers. & Soc. Psych. 1037 (1980); Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross and Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimila-
tion and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evi-
dence, 37 J. Pers. & Soc. Psych. 2098 (1979).
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processing of new information and the search of memory to aid in infer-
ence are biased, sometimes heavily, toward the confirmation of existing
schema. Though hardly immune, attitudes and beliefs are change-resis-
tant. This resistance is strengthened by the act of explanation. 0 4 Cogni-
tive conservatism is an adaptive response for two reasons: first, because
a truly open mind-one that constantly rethinks all possible situations
with attention to all plausible cues-would be unmanageable and inef-
fective; second, because consistency is a socially desirable trait. Fur-
thermore, in a normal setting, the process of social learning contributes
to reinforce existing schemas. Everyone else is acting as usual, so pre-
sumably nothing has changed. The resulting circularity should be clear.
The concept of cognitive conservatism suggests that even absent
any motivational factors, a lawyer is likely to dismiss as unimportant or
aberrational the first few negative bits of information that she receives
regarding a client or situation. A lawyer, for example, will test a single
complaint or warning first for schema consistency, and if any reasona-
ble fit is possible, she will retain the positive impression.10 5 Thus, the
lawyer can readily dismiss a warning from an employee or investor as
the product of idiosyncratic disgruntlement, since most others similarly
situated apparently are not bothered. Moreover, the constant stream of
additional bits of information about the situation-whether positive, or
simply noisy-will often dilute the negatives,10 providing an opportu-
nity for manipulation by a clever client.
C. Motivated Reasoning and the "Red Flag"
To this point, we have described mental processes that psycholo-
gists describe as purely cognitive or "cold."'01 7 They are simply heuristic
devices that mediate the potential for overload. As such, reasonably in-
telligent people, surely all successful lawyers, should be capable of shift-
ing to a more vigilant form of inference when situational cues prompt
it. In fact, research shows that the purely cognitive tendency toward
conservatism, though pervasive, is not by itself all that hard to over-
come. An observer will factor in particularly salient bits of disconfirm-
ing information. If a person can be motivated toward diligence-i.e.,
104. See Anderson, Lepper and Ross, 39 J. Pers. & Soc. Psych. at 1047.
105. See Kunda, 108 Psych. Bull. at 482-83 (cited in note 89).
106. Dilution is an often-observed phenomenon. Simply by placing information in the con-
text of additional irrelevant bits, its influence is diminished. See Nisbett and Ross, Human Infer-
ence at 154-56 (cited in note 98); Aronson, Social Animal at 131-32 (cited in note 79); Fiske and
Taylor, Social Cognition at 355-57 (cited in note 79). Conversely, people overweight evidence that
is particularly salient or vivid.
107. See generally, Jungermann, The Two Camps on Rationality in Arkes and Hammond,
eds., Judgment and Decision Making 627 (cited in note 96).
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offered a financial incentive, or told that she is accountable for the ac-
curacy of her judgments' 08-a more careful information search and pro-
cess of inference likely will follow.
According to many researchers, however, motivated reasoning is
double-edged. The apparently ascendent view in psychology is that
"hot" influences-such as ego, emotion and mood-have demonstrably
significant effects on both perception and inference that can lead to di-
minished as well as enhanced vigilance. 109 And within this genre, much
of the inquiry focuses on the role of self-serving biases in the cognitive
process. This research suggests strongly that under special circum-
stances, people will be motivated preconsciously to avoid the apprecia-
tion of adverse information and hence fail to adopt appropriately
vigilant cognitive modes. Their thinking turns wishful
When? One theory derives, but is now in many ways removed, from
Leon Festinger's classic work in the 1950s and '60s on cognitive disso-
nance. 110 Central to it are two notions: commitment"' and self-esteem.
As noted earlier, many psychologists believe that self-esteem, even if
excessive or unrealistic, is a highly adaptive human trait, associated
with a large number of functional behaviors." 2 So, the cognitive appa-
ratus operates to protect it. When people voluntarily commit them-
selves to a certain position, attitude or belief, the subsequent discovery
of information that indicates harmful consequences flowing from that
108. See, for example, Philip E. Tetlock and Jae II Kim, Accountability and Judgment
Processes in a Personality Prediction Task, 52 J. Pers. & Soc. Psych. 700 (1987).
109. The distinction between hot and cold cognitive approaches represents one of the funda-
mental divisions in the field, and most experimental findings can be explained on either basis. See
Philip E. Tetlock and Ariel Levi, Attribution Bias: On the Inconclusiveness of the Cognition-
Motivation Debate, 18 J. Exp. Soc. Psych. 68 (1982). The cold cognitive approach is heavily influ-
enced by work in artificial intelligence. Here, egocentric biases exist, but largely because of the
distortion in perception caused by the high ratio of self-related information inputs to nonself-
related ones in the reality construct. For representative examples of cold process emphasis, see
Nisbett and Ross, Human Inference at 228 (cited in note 98); and the various papers in Daniel
Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky, eds., Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases (Cambridge, 1982). On the ascendancy of motivation theory, see Kunda, 108 Psych. Bull. at
480 (cited in note 89); Fiske and Taylor, Social Cognition at 13 (cited in note 79). In fact, many of
the researchers in the "cold" camp acknowledge the likelihood of self-serving and other motivated
biases, but simply question whether laboratory research has made a scientific case for their exis-
tence. See Nisbett and Ross, Human Inference at 233-34 (cited in note 98).
110. Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Row, Peterson, 1957).
111. Commitment is one of the most widely credited motivating factors in behavior. See gen-
erally Charles A. Kiesler, The Psychology of Commitment (Acad., 1971); Cialdini, Influence at 58
(cited in note 92); Joel Cooper and Russell H. Fazio, A New Look at Dissonance Theory, in Leo-
nard Berkowitz, ed., 17 Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 229 (Acad., 1984). Commit-
ment affects cognition even in circumstances where the subject is accountable for his judgments.
See Philip E. Tetlock, Linda Skitka and Richard Boettger, Social and Cognitive Strategies for
Coping With Accountability: Conformity, Complexity and Bolstering, 57 J. Pers. & Soc. Psych.
632 (1989).
112. See notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
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commitment directly threatens their self-concept as good, worthwhile
individuals. Thus, cognitive processes will work to suppress such infor-
mation if at all possible."' If the cues are too salient to be suppressed,
other defenses operate, such as, shifts in attitudes and avoidance of re-
sponsibility. The self-deception is compounded by people's tendency to
believe that others see the world roughly like they do, something re-
ferred to as the false consensus effect,1"4 and thus treat their myopic
construal as self-evident fact in predicting the behavior of others.
What this means, of course, is that once commitment has occurred,
and especially if it is publicly expressed and repeated, what might be an
obvious red flag to a disinterested observer may not appear such to the
actor. What lay people call "blind spots" may be pervasive whenever
there is the requisite sunk cost of ego commitment. Psychologists and
others have used this theory to explain the rather robust phenomenon
of escalating commitment-why bankers often throw good money after
bad,1' 5 why gamblers and investors persist much too long"' and why
nations often fight wars well beyond any apparent usefulness. 1 7 Its rel-
evance to legal representation is palpable, for there are few settings in
which commitment is more vivid and subject to public expression and
repetition than when a lawyer undertakes to act on behalf of a client.
The most extensive and well-known work on the role of commit-
ment in the decision-making process in an institutional environment
was done by Irving Janis and Leon Mann."18 Although they emphasize
113. For a particularly lucid discussion, see Aronson, Social Animal at 202-03 (cited in note
79). For specific research support for self-serving motivational bias in the processing of external
cues, see Greenwald, 35 Am. Psych. at 606-08 (cited in note 97); Ziva Kunda, Motivated Inference:
Self-Serving Generation and Evaluation of Causal Theories, 53 J. Pers. & Soc. Psych. 636 (1987);
Kunda, 108 Psych. Bull. at 483 (cited in note 89); Tom Pyszczynski and Jeff Greenberg, Toward
an Integration of Cognitive and Motivational Perspectives on Social Inference: A Biased Hypoth-
esis-Testing Model, in Leonard Berkowitz, ed., 20 Advances in Experimental Social Psychology
297 (Acad., 1987) (discussing self-esteem); Fiske and Taylor, Social Cognition at 212-16 (cited in
note 79) (discussing self-enhancement); id. at 468-71 (finding information processing consistent
with attitudes).
114. See Gary Marks and Norman Miller, Ten Years of Research on the False Consensus
Effect: An Empirical and Theoretical Review, 102 Psych. Rev. 72 (1987). Whether the purported
consensus is really false, or whether instead the use of personal information may be a "best availa-
ble" predictor, is an interesting question. See Robyn Dawes, The Potential Nonfalsity of the False
Consensus Effect, in Hogarth, ed., Insights in Decision Making at 179 (cited in note 90).
115. See Barry Staw, The Escalation of Commitment to a Course of Action, 6 Acad. Mgmt.
Rev. 577 (1981).
116. See id. For other related perspectives, see Thomas Gilovich, Biased Evaluation and
Persistence in Gambling, 44 J. Pers. & Soc. Psych. 1110 (1983) (considering both cognitive and
motivated influences). Compare Hersh Shefrin and Meir Stetman, The Disposition to Sell Win-
ners Too Early and Ride Losers Too Long: Theory and Evidence, 40 J. Fin. 777 (1985).
117. See Janis and Mann, Decision-Making at 280 (cited in note 88); Aronson, The Social
Animal at 188-89 (cited in note 79).
118. See Janis and Mann, Decision-Making at 280.
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the avoidance of stress as opposed to the protection of self-esteem as
the underlying motivation, their analysis is essentially the same. In
those situations in which the negative consequences of prior commit-
ment are foreseeable and there is little objective hope of finding satis-
factory solutions, the human mind adopts a preconscious mode of
defensive avoidance. This bolsters the commitment by "excluding infor-
mation about the most threatening consequences of the least, objection-
able course of action,"'119 which typically is maintaining the status quo.
The Janis and Mann research looks at these mental processes in con-
nection with a variety of high-level decisions in situations that bear
marked similarities to the unraveling of massive financial frauds, 120
with professionals acting in a far less vigilant fashion than the objective
evidence would warrant.
That lawyers are particularly prone to blind spots regarding their
clients should come as no surprise. Their commitment is clear and pub-
lic, and they are called upon frequently to articulate the client's posi-
tion-something that polarizes attitudes and beliefs, for the act of
saying often strengthens belief.'2 ' Successful lawyers generally have ex-
tremely high levels of self-esteem, which makes defensive avoidance all
the more likely. 2 2 In all probability, moreover, such a strong tendency
will not subject the lawyer to a significant market penalty. To the con-
trary, the tendency to block or recast adverse information will enhance
the optimism and sense of control by the lawyer as well as her sense of
loyalty to the client. These attributes are attractive to both current and
potential clients and predict ever higher levels of success over time.
People who are highly confident of their client's position are likely to
make superior negotiators, probably the central skill of the transac-
tional lawyer. From our working assumption that serious instances of
client fraud are relatively infrequent, we would predict that the func-
tional, adaptive role of ego-biased perception offers benefits that signifi-
119. Id. at 124 (cited in note 88). For a recent updating, see Irving Janis, Crucial Decisions:
Leadership in Policymaking and Crisis Management (Free Press, 1989). Postcommitment defen-
sive bolstering is also emphasized in Tetlock, Skitka and Boettger, 57 J. Pers. & Soc. Psych. 632
(cited in note 111).
120. Examples include planning for the energy crisis in the 1970s and Pearl Harbor.
121. See Aronson, The Social Animal at 197 (cited in note 79); Anderson, Lepper and Ross,
37 J. Pers. & Soc. Psych. at 1047 (cited in note 103). The generation of defensive explanations
serves, moreover, to dilute the negative evidence. See Philip Tetlock and Richard Boettger, Ac-
countability: A Social Magnifier of the Dilution Effect, 57 J. Pers. & Soc. Psych. 388 (1989).
122. See Fiske and Taylor, Social Cognition at 471-72 (cited in note 79).
123. On the role of self-confidence, see Gerald Williams, Legal Negotiation and Settlement
27 (West, 1983); Max Bazerman and Margaret Neale, Heuristics in Negotiation: Limitations to
Effective Dispute Resolution, in Arkes and Hammond, eds., Judgment and Decision Making at




cantly outweigh the reputational risks associated with representing a
client who turns out to be acting fraudulently. Reputational protection
will occur largely in the process of choosing whether to represent the
client in the first place. In other words, one can make the interesting
claim that the lawyers' marketplace success may have a positive corre-
lation with the presence of the specific egocentric biases we have de-
scribed. Lawyers may be egotistic because they are successful, and
successful because they are egotistic.
12
D. Lawyers in Groups
To this point, the discussion has presumed a single lawyer repre-
senting a client. That, of course, is artificial, since most transactional
representation of any significance is done by a team of lawyers. Our
analysis of the process of social cognition must expand to confront the
group dynamic.
The additional points to make are somewhat offsetting. On one
hand, the presence of lower-level attorneys suggests that since they did
not choose to commit to the representation but instead were assigned to
the task, the threat of negative information to self-esteem is less and
the likelihood of noticing red flags is greater. Even more, rotation of
lawyers into the representation after it has begun introduces perspec-
tives unencumbered by commitment biases. In fact, some psychologists
recommend staffing rotation on projects in business settings precisely
because it can be an antidote to the cover-up of misconduct. 12 5
On the other hand, an attorney who is new to a situation, especially
an inexperienced one, is particularly prone to rely on social learning as
the basis for constructing a schema. The fact that those more senior
and more familiar with the situation are behaving as if there is no prob-
lem provides a strong cue. This, indeed, is one explanation for the re-
duced tendency of people in groups to act heroically, since
responsibility is effectively diffused. 26 To this, naturally, must be
124. Note that nothing that we have described suggests that the ego-biased lawyer operates
under any disability in the processing of information generally. She may be particularly perceptive
in most of the information processing tasks that lawyers perform, for example, perceiving threats
to client interests or the motives of others.
125. See, for example, Jack Katz, Concerted Ignorance: The Social Construction of a Cover-
up, 8 Urb. Life 295, 306-09 (1980); Staw, 6 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. at 585 (cited in note 115). For a set
of articles on the translation of social cognition research to organizational behavior, see Henry
Sims and Dennis Gioia, eds., The Thinking Organization (Jossey-Bass, 1986). Although junior per-
sons, or others rotated into a representation do not make a commitment to that representation
specifically, bias still might result from the prior commitment to the firm.
126. See Cialdini, Influence at 126 (cited in note 92); Bibb Latane and John Darley, Group
Inhibition of Bystander Intervention in Emergencies, 10 J. Pers. & Soc. Psych. 215 (1968). In
groups, moreover, the simple diffusion of information will reduce the likelihood that any one mem-
ber will suspect the fraud, even in cold cognitive terms.
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added the situational pressures on junior members of groups to conform
to apparent norms.127
E. OPM as an Illustration
As noted earlier, one of the most frequently adduced illustrations
of lawyers' involvement in client fraud involved the law firm of Singer
Hutner Levine & Seeman in its representation of OPM Leasing Ser-
vices, Inc.'2  To summarize the complexly fascinating story,'2 9 OPM, an
equipment leasing company, grew to a large size primarily through
fraudulent financing. The same collateral was pledged multiple times,
with concealment through forgeries and other defalcations. OPM's chief
principals had actively and knowingly engaged in the fraud, and had
assembled a team of loyal subordinates to assist them.
The aspect of the OPM scandal that has intrigued people the most
relates to the participation of law firm Singer Hutner,'3 0 which pre-
pared the documentation and closed nearly all the fraudulent transac-
tions. Did the firm's principal partners know or consciously disregard
the wrongdoing? The motive, as many have noted, was plain: the firm
was disproportionately dependent on OPM for their revenues. The ma-
jority of Singer Hutner's business was OPM-related.
As the story is recounted, bright red flags abound. OPM's princi-
pals were indicted for a prior check-kiting scheme. Office routines and
procedures were unusual. Certain auditing representations were with-
held. Later, some accounting personnel resigned, warning that cash-flow
127. Irving Janis has termed the stress-related pressures toward group conformity
"groupthink." Irving Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos
(Houghton Mifflin, 1982). Groupthink in legal settings is noted in James C. Freund, Advise and
Invent: The Lawyer as Counselor-Strategies and Other Essays 28-33 (Prentice Hall, 1990). For
interesting discussions of ethical responsibilities when lawyers are acting in teams, see Twitchell,
72 Minn. L. Rev. 697 (cited in note 90); Harold Levinson, Book Review: Ethics Inside the Law
Firm, 36 Vand. L. Rev. 847 (1983); Harold Levinson, To A Young Lawyer: Thoughts on Disobedi-
ence, 50 Mo. L. Rev. 483 (1985).
128. In re OPM Leasing Services, Inc., 46 Bankr. 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). See text accompany-
ing notes 5-7.
129. The primary source document exploring the OPM matter is the Report of the Bank-
ruptcy Trustee, In re OPM Leasing Services Inc., No. 81-B-10533 (Bankr., April 25, 1983), an
extensive investigatory report prepared by the law firm of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering as counsel
for the trustee. OPM is also the subject of a book by Gandossy, entitled Bad Business (cited in
note 5) and extensive journalistic commentary. See Stuart Taylor, Ethics and the Law: A Case
History, N. Y. Times Mag. at 31 (Jan. 9, 1983). The Gandossy book is a thoughtful application of
social psychological principles to the OPM case (see especially ch. 12), and makes some of the
same points discussed here.
130. Since the firm is an entity, it is misleading to speak of what it knew. At least one of its
partners, Andrew Reinhart, had a close personal relationship with the primary wrongdoers, and his
knowledge, which would be attributed to the firm for liability purposes, may have been substantial.
More representative would be the state of mind of the principal senior partner, Joseph Hutner.
(Vol. 46:75
CLIENT FRAUD
problems were nearly insurmountable. Ultimately, OPM's principals
confessed to their lawyers a significant volume of fraud, but the law
firm kept doing closings after receiving simple, albeit emotional, assur-
ances that the fraud had ceased. All this time, a relatively straightfor-
ward set of steps, most notably assembling accurate records regarding
the collateral, would have exposed the wrongdoing. Singer Hutner fi-
nally did resign as counsel when events made the on-going character of
the fraud unmistakable, although it did not pass this information on to
successor counsel.
To any objective observer, the law firm's overall nonfeasance seems
consciously reckless, perhaps even willful. Yet the firm's principals
claim innocence, except for the commonplace and mild: "In retrospect,
we probably should have. . . ." The credibility of that claim is, of
course, hard to assess. Their story is hardly implausible from a psycho-
logical perspective, however. As danger signs were becoming more visi-
ble, the firm retained two well-known ethics consultants, an odd
behavior for lawyers consciously engaged in wrongdoing. 131 The lawyers'
commitment to OPM, well before any danger signals emerged, was
plain. They were rapidly increasing their income and stature in the le-
gal community, something that no doubt contributed to high reserves of
self-esteem. Each of the negative, disconfirming bits of evidence was
diluted by a constant display of positive signals-increasing business,
highly publicized awards to some of OPM's principals for charitable
and religious work-as well as a numbing routine.132 Perhaps most im-
portant, the lawyers saw many others with direct interests at
stake-OPM's lenders (including many major banks), its accountants
and its investment bankers (Goldman Sachs)-acting without undue
concern: a dramatic instance of social learning. There were, in other
words, plenty of cues to support a strong preconscious bias toward pres-
ervation of a positive schema, which would block any cognitive shift to
greater vigilance. To this was added one other common reasoning flaw:
once the past fraud was uncovered, the lawyers imagined themselves in
the position of the OPM officials and concluded that under no circum-
stances would they be so foolish as to continue it. as While particularly
131. Gandossy, Bad Business at 136-38 (cited in note 5). The ethics consultants, including
the dean of Fordham Law School, were not asked to make a de novo assessment of the facts, and
relied on information supplied by the firm to give their blessing to its continued involvement with
OPM. Joseph Hutner also consulted with a number of professors at Harvard Law School. Id. at
255 n. 19.
132. The presence of routine (for example, paperwork, established bureaucratic procedures)
as having the capacity to induce a false sense of comfort and diminished vigilance is made in
Harold Wilensky, Organizational Intelligence 91-92 (Basic Books, 1967). See Gandossy, Bad Busi-
ness at 211-12.
133. Gandossy, Bad Business at 144. See Robyn Dawes, Rational Choice in an Uncertain
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vivid in the OPM situation, similar motivational influences can be
found in other notable lawyer-assisted frauds.134
F. The Credibility Problem
A common observation regarding lawyers' state of mind in liability
settings is that what matters is not so much what the lawyer thought as
what a judge or jury later thinks she thought.1 3 5 As in OPM, there is a
severe problem of credibility when lawyers claim lack of awareness or
conscious appreciation of significant risk. The social cognition research
simply strengthens the plausibility of such claims. No one, however, can
deny that in a substantial number of cases, actual knowledge or con-
scious disregard does occur and subsequent excuses are disingenuous.
13 6
Precisely how judges or juries will respond to the credibility prob-
lem is unpredictable, influenced by a host of situational factors, such as
witness demeanor, character testimony and lawyering quality. Two as-
pects of the social cognition literature suggest, however, that all other
things being equal, factfinders frequently will reject lack-of-awareness
claims. First, none of the cognitive filtering mechanisms that infect ego-
involved actors will affect unbiased observers, and they will not experi-
ence comparable difficulty perceiving the intensity of the red flags.
Their schemas differ radically from the outset, and the circumstantial
evidence of awareness will seem quite damning. Observers also show a
strong bias toward dispositional attributions:13 7 they explain failures in
World 245-46 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988) (describing similar thinking on the part of Israeli
officials before the Seven Days war). This tendency is closely related, if not the same as, the false
consensus effect. See note 114; Thomas Gilovich, Differential Construal and the False Consensus
Effect, 59 J. Pers. & Soc. Psych. 623 (1990); Dale Griffin and Lee Ross, Subjective Construal,
Social Inference, and Human Misunderstanding, in Mark Zanna, ed., 24 Advances in Experimen-
tal Social Psychology 319, 345 (Acad., 1991).
134. For example, in SEC v. National Student Marketing, 457 F. Supp. 602 (D.D.C. 1978),
the lawyers had invested substantial time and effort in creating the merger, something strongly
likely to bias perception toward its consummation. Similarly, in Carter and Johnson [1981 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,847 (Feb. 28, 1981), we can observe an escalation of
lawyer commitment through a series of small early steps.
135. See, for example, Hodes, 35 U. Miami L. Rev. at 804 n.233 (cited in note 20).
136. Even when wrongdoing properly may be characterized as intentional, a person may de-
velop excuses that she later believes, an exercise in self-deception. See Charles Snyder, The Ex-
cuse: An Amazing Grace?, in B. Schlenker, ed., The Self and Social Life at 235, 252-53 (cited in
note 88).
137. See, for example, Lee Ross and Richard E. Nisbett, The Person and the Situation:
Perspectives of Social Psychology 87-89, 140-41 (Temple, 1991); Fiske and Taylor, Social Cogni-
tion at 72-75 (cited in note 79). To the extent that a lawyer is part of a group, some of the attribu-
tional problem may be avoided. See Valerie P. Hans and M. David Ermann, Responses to
Corporate Versus Individual Wrongdoing, 13 L. & Human Behav. 151 (1989). The problem is a
complicated one, since a reverse process also can work. If the factfinder can be led to construct an
initial story or schema that assumes that the lawyer is a good person, based on her reputation,
demeanor or testimony, the likelihood of finding wrongdoing in fact may diminish. For an interest-
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terms of character flaws, with insufficient attention to situational influ-
ences. While it is by no means inevitable, a factfinder may be more
likely to blame lawyers than is reasonable.
138
The second concept is what psychologists refer to as the hindsight
bias. Studies show that persons asked to assess the likelihood that some
event would occur are affected strongly by knowing that the event did
occur.139 Persons with such knowledge will overestimate the risk consid-
erably. What might be an ambiguous warning to even an objective actor
will seem clear cut to a juror informed at the outset of trial of the ca-
lamity and its consequences. Research, then, has provided empirical
support for the commonplace fear of the liability risks associated with
20/20 hindsight.
G. Another Assessment
Whether we should place so much trust in social cognition research
that we allow it to influence the formulation of legal strategies is a
bothersome question. Social science theory is better suited to offer per-
spective than proof, and dominating legal paradigms will not retreat
meekly from the assumption of pervasive rationality,140 especially when
the subject is lawyering. What the social cognition material does best is
arm those already inclined, by observation or experience, toward a view
of legal practice in which the influences of ego, self-deception and blind
ing discussion of the "story" model of factfinder decisionmaking, drawing on many of the princi-
ples of social cognition, see Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Tests of
the Story Model for Juror Decision Making, 62 J. Pers. & Soc. Psych. 189 (1992). See also Michael
J. Saks and Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial By Heuris-
tics, in Arkes and Hammond, eds., Judgment and Decision Making 213 (cited in note 96).
138. For a view that blaming can be a product of the observer's need to explain the actor's
behavior in a way that makes it appear deviant and thus less threatening, see Kelly G. Shaver, The
Attribution of Blame: Causality, Responsibility, and Blameworthiness 132-36 (Springer-Verlag,
1985). For an overview of how blaming behaviors are learned, see Thomas R. Schulz and John M.
Darley, An Information-Processing Model of Retributive Moral Judgments Based on "Legal Rea-
soning," in William M. Kurtines and Jacob L. Gewirtz, eds., 2 Handbook on Moral Behavior and
Development 247 (Lawrence Erlbaum, 1991).
139. See Jonathan D. Casper, Kennette Benedict and Jo L. Perry, Juror Decision Making,
Attitudes, and the Hindsight Bias, 13 L. & Human Behav. 291 (1989); Baruch Fischhoff, Per-
ceived Informativeness of Facts, 3 J. Exp. Psych.; Human Percept. & Perf. 349 (1977); Baruch
Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight, in
Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, eds., Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Bias 335 (Cambridge, 1982); Fiske and Taylor, Social Cognition at 376-77 (cited in note 79);
Edwards and Von Winterfeldt, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 243-44 (cited in note 81).
140. See text accompanying notes 171-73. The idea of diminished responsibility by virtue of
unconscious impulses has long been debated in criminal law, with recognition that what may be
plausible psychological theories fit uneasily in the legal framework of guilt and innocence. See, for
example, Michael S. Moore, Responsibility and the Unconscious, 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1563 (1980);
Stephen J. Morse, Failed Explanations and Criminal Responsibility: Experts and the Uncon-
scious, 68 Va. L. Rev. 971 (1982).
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spots compete with rationality and mindfulness-but not so cynical
that they attribute the vast bulk of lawyer nonfeasance to simple greed
or failures of will. Social cognition does help us account for why there is
so little acknowledgement of guilt or responsibility in business and
politics, even though there is so much harm.""
If we choose to credit it, the message of the psychology research is
a simple one, and should not be overstated: In a representational set-
ting, a lawyer's ability to detect client fraud is diminished by cognitive
bias. Diminished is the key word; the ability to detect fraud is by no
means rendered impossible. There are plenty of cases of intentional and
subjectively reckless assistance, and plenty of disingenuous excuses. We
simply have another behavioral explanation to consider before confi-
dently hypothesizing about the apparent incidence of lawyer complicity.
Whether there is a legal message is speculative, for we have no way
of knowing how frequently the behavioral explanation is the best one.
Absent empirical evidence, we only can guess. But if the behavioral ex-
planation is accurate with some frequency, then there will be a strong
impact on the legal standard when liability requires a subjectively cul-
pable state of mind. To the extent that factfinders generally make accu-
rate state of mind determinations, the behavioral explanation would
circumscribe the attorney's scope of liability noticeably. This sort of
gatekeeper liability would be less than potent, and the expected return
on our investment of enforcement resources would be comparatively
low. There is some reason to doubt the ability of factfinders to judge
state of mind accurately, however, and to expect some bias in favor of
liability. While this will expand the incidence of liability findings, it
does so by effectively introducing something more akin to a legal regime
based on objective fault, i.e., negligence or gross negligence. It may be
that the major consequence of moving to a "knowledge plus" state of
mind standard for attorneys' liability, as many courts have done in the
securities area, is to protect against this risk of error and assure the
limited liability net.
142
To the extent that the prevailing liability standard is based on neg-
ligence, the message of the social cognition literature is different. From
a doctrinal standpoint, the absence of conscious disregard of risk does
141. On tobacco company executives' ability to disbelieve evidence regarding the harms of
smoking, see Aronson, The Social Animal at 179 (cited in note 79). For an interesting account of
the decision of Beech-Nut executives to authorize the dilution of apple juice with foreign materi-
als, drawing heavily on cognitive dissonance materials, see Zimbardo and Leippe, The Psychology
of Attitude at 120-21 (cited in note 88).
142. See text accompanying notes 44-46. As in cases like Schatz and Abell, the presence of
the high-conscious-intent standard makes it possible to remove cases from jury consideration sim-
ply because of plaintiffs' failure to plead facts to suggest such a state of mind.
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not preclude a factfinder from determining that the lawyer's conduct
failed to satisfy the social norm of due care.143 Gatekeeper liability
structures, however, generally are justified on the assumption that they
provide incentives to careful client monitoring. Lawyers with a dimin-
ished cognitive capacity for monitoring may not be the best candidates
for that role. For this strategy to succeed, we must assume that either
the law can reduce the incapacity or that efficient institutional struc-
tures will develop to minimize the risks associated with the cognitive
imperfections of individual lawyers. The next section tests those
assumptions.
IV. THERAPEUTIC INTERVENTION
Our discussion to this point has been descriptive, not normative.
We have considered reasons why there might be an unexpectedly high
level of apparent lawyer complicity in client fraud, without saying any-
thing about the quality of the prevailing norms or whether anything
should change as a matter of policy. This Part visits those questions by
thinking through how the psychological insights might inform the pol-
icy debate. In so doing, we shall simply assume that diminished cogni-
tive capacity is a nontrivial explanation for lawyer complicity.
Both individuals and social institutions adapt to ecological change.
To suggest that cognitive tendencies diminish the ability to compre-
hend the harm that one causes is not to imply that the condition is
incurable. If the perception of lawyer complicity is problematic, we
should consider whether patterns of behavior might evolve or be in-
duced to remedy it. We shall first examine whether there are reputa-
tional incentives-at the individual, firm or profession levels-to
neutralize the incentives that induce complicity. Then we will discuss
the efficacy of altering the prevailing legal regime to make lawyers more
sensitive to the risk of client misconduct.
A. Reputational Incentives
The role of reputation in marketplace behavior is an often-studied
phenomenon. To economists, a good reputation is an asset to be culti-
vated, preserved, rented out or wasted." Accountants, lawyers and in-
143. The element of intent is one of the features distinguishing criminal from tort law. See,
for example, Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Prefer-
ence-Shaping Policy, 1990 Duke L. J. 1, 25-26.
144. See, for example, Kraakman, 2 J. L. Econ. & Org. at 96-100 (cited in note 11); Ronald J.
Gilson and Reiner H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549
(1984); Ronald T. Gilson and Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among Human Capitalists: An Eco-




vestment bankers, in particular, have strong reasons to put their
reputational capital to profitable use. We might expect these profes-
sionals to seek to avoid complicity for reputational reasons alone, and
to respond promptly to evidence of abuse. In aiding-and-abetting cases,
the Seventh Circuit has referred specifically to the check of reputa-
tional interest, invoking heavy pleading burdens that force plaintiffs to
explain why professional firms would be willing to risk their reputations
for the simple receipt of hourly fees from a corrupt client. 14 5
From a psychological perspective, reputation is different, a catch-
all that describes the schemas that people develop about others to gen-
erate expectations about their future behavior. Like all schemas, repu-
tation often is built from a limited set of first-hand observations,
extensively supplemented by social learning. A good reputation can be
fortuitous, but once established is quite resistant to change. It readily
becomes self-fulfilling. Likewise, people's impressions of their own rep-
utations rarely are realistic, but do have the same prophetic capacity.
There are numerous reasons to doubt that either the legal or social
cognitive version of reputation would by itself cause lawyers to become
more circumspect in dealing with existing clients. Foremost, we can
question whether an instance of complicity really will generate a serious
marketplace penalty. While some clients do require reputational assis-
tance by their lawyers in business transactions, many others will prefer
zealous representation and strategic counselling, leaving bonding assis-
tance to other mechanisms, if desired at all. A firm charged with going
too far in the representation of a client may find other and prospective
clients unbothered, perhaps even pleased. Skillful public relations can
soften any concern about moral turpitude: individual personnel can be
scapegoated, prosecutors or plaintiffs can be charged with excess, and
the firm can portray itself as the victim of client deceit. The reputa-
tional feedback, in other words, readily can be neutral or ambiguous.
1 6
145. See Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1986).
See also DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that it would be
irrational for the accountants to risk their reputations with involvement in a fraud); SEC v. Price
Waterhouse, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,914 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1992). It often has
been noted that individual lawyers and accountants have different preferences from their firms.
They may be tempted to risk the firm's reputational capital in return for pecuniary or career-
specific gain, and the firm's supervisory procedures simply may be insufficient to deter them.
146. For an interesting discussion of how moral turpitude often has no marketplace penalty,
noting the ambiguity of reputational feedback, see Amar Bhide and Howard H. Stevenson, Why
Be Honest if Honesty Doesn't Pay, Harv. Bus. Rev. 121, 125 (Sept.-Oct. 1990). On the need for
unambiguous feedback as the basis for accurate social learning, see text accompanying notes 98-99.
Some journalists have commented that the Kaye Scholer firm (see note 2) has not suffered signifi-
cantly from its involvement with Lincoln Federal, in part because of a major public relations cam-
paign designed to make itself appear the victim. See France, Legal Times at 28 (cited in note 2);
Susan Beck and Michael Orey, They Got What They Deserved, Am. Law 68 (May 1992).
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Even aside from this, we can be exceedingly skeptical that the
reputational incentive alone can motivate individual lawyers to be more
vigilant in assessing their clients' situations. True, the public repetition
of stories of lawyer complicity may trigger some self-reflection and re-
consideration of one's own client relationships. The message of the
literature on motivated reasoning, however, is that the ego protection
and stress reduction provided by preconscious cognitive buffers is not
so easily overcome.1 47 Moreover, these buffers in the marketplace have
an adaptive quality that leads to less conflicted, more client-centered
performance of most legal tasks.148 Most successful lawyers will view
the misfortune that befalls some of their colleagues as excusable (e.g.,
the colleague will be seen as a victim) or they will attribute it to venal-
ity or other flaws to which they think themselves not so susceptible.
Law firms will approach the reputational problem somewhat differ-
ently. The risk of lawyer blind spots is one of a number of reputational
threats to the firm. Corruption by individual lawyers must be con-
trolled. Practices such as the lock-step compensation systems once
prevalent in large law firms 149 and the careful scrutiny of clients150 can
be understood as efforts to deal with the moral hazard problem. There
are practical limits, however, to firms' motivation and ability to detect
and monitor fraud. A number of institutional devices can be imple-
mented in an effort to overcome some of the cognitive biases that we
have observed. Such devices include rotation of personnel,151 inducing
greater familiarity with categories of red flags through in-house educa-
tion programs,'5 2 recordkeeping regarding all suspicious circumstances
and, most important, peer review, which introduces noncommitted
147. See text accompanying notes 109-23.
148. See text accompanying notes 123-24. These adaptive qualities make if far less likely that
lawyers' collective consciousness will be raised effectively over time. In contrast, racism and sexism
have little, if any, adaptive value in a professional setting. Thus, predicting that "client-centric"
biases will diminish in the same way as racial or sexual stereotypes may be overoptimistic.
149. See Gilson and Mnookin, 37 Stan. L. Rev. at 384-89 (cited in note 144). As the authors
note, such practices are under great stress as clients become more savvy and willing to shop
around, using multiple law firms on a transaction-specific basis, and as lawyer mobility increases.
See also Gilson, 49 Md. L. Rev. 869 (cited in note 8), for an update on the questionable viability of
lawyers as gatekeepers in such an environment.
150. For a useful discussion of various screening mechanisms law firms might adopt, see
Mary C. Daly, Lawyering After Kaye, Scholer: Preventing the Problems Before They Arise, in
Jonathan J. Leiner, The Attorney-Client Relationship After Kaye, Scholer 183 (P.L.I., 1992).
151. See note 125.
152. Much work in this direction has been undertaken with respect to the training of audi-
tors. See, for example, W. Steve Albrecht, David J. Cherrington, I. Reed Payne, Allan V. Roe and
Marshall B. Romney, Auditor Involvement in the Detection of Fraud, in Robert K. Elliott and
John J. Willingham, eds., Management Fraud: Detection and Deterrence 207 (Petrocelli, "1980).




points of view to the process of representation. 153 Each of these bureau-
cratic interventions comes at considerable cost, however, in terms of
time and effort as well as the more subtle interference with individual
partner autonomy that otherwise characterizes many highly successful
firms. Such steps also may threaten working relationships with many
clients, signalling an environment of mistrust rather than loyalty. More-
over, none of these interventions is even remotely foolproof.
Nor is it clear that the expected return would make these reputa-
tional expenditures profitable. As Reiner Kraakman has observed,15 4
outsiders often lack the ability to distinguish among firms, so they ap-
ply average reputations derived from a broad market segment. The firm
that invests heavily in an internal monitoring system will not reap a
commensurate reward unless it can distinguish itself from competitors'
imitations. The first firm attempting to pass on those costs probably
will be rebuffed.
For the profession as a whole, there are some possibilities through
bar association activities.155 Law schools might try to alter the cognitive
biases before the young lawyer begins her professional career. 156 Contin-
uing legal education could play a comparable role. Standardized moni-
toring procedures, such as agreements as to what precautionary steps
are appropriate in transactional representations, in some cases could
minimize the competitive disadvantage incurred by firms hesitant to be
too far out front of their peers. Transactions come in such a wide vari-
ety, however, that standard procedures must be at a high level of gener-
ality, leaving ample room for both honest misunderstanding and
cheating. Moreover, there are likely to be substantial difficulties in ar-
riving at an appropriate consensus given the diversity of providers of
legal services and their conflicting interests. Finally, the growing inter-
nalization of legal services by clients further limits the bar's ability to
standardize more costly forms of representation in the name of its own
reputational interest.
5 7
153. See, for example, Janis and Mann, Decision-Making at 367-404 (cited in note 88).
154. Kraakman, 2 J. L. Econ. & Org. at 97-98 (cited in note 11).
155. For a thoughtful discussion of self-regulatory steps, see James H. Cheek, III, Profes-
sional Responsibility and Self-Regulation of the Securities Lawyer, 32 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 597
(1975).
156. In all likelihood, individual lawyers will never be resistant to commitment-generated
biases unless and until they see their relationship with a client as something different from a com-
mitment. Given the ABA's celebration of loyalty and commitment, it may be impossible to gener-
ate more perceptive, as opposed to more ethical, lawyers.
157. See Gilson, 49 Md. L. Rev. at 913-15 (cited in note 8). The ethical issues relating to the
internalization of legal business by clients are reviewed in Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel
Movement, Professional Judgment and Organizational Representation, 64 Ind. L. J. 479 (1989).
See also Ted Schneyer, Professionalism and Public Policy: The Case of House Counsel, 2 Ge-




The foregoing should make clear that if we are unsatisfied with the
perceived incidence of attorney complicity in client fraud, then some
tinkering with legal incentives is necessary. Without underestimating
the practical difficulty of this task, given the fragmented legal structure
governing attorney behavior,158 we should consider at least in theory
whether strengthening the general norm is likely to be an efficient
method of thwarting client fraud.
There are a number of public- and private-law strategies that could
alter the prevailing legal structure. As we have seen, there has been a
tendency to undermine the general norm through a niggardly applica-
tion of the substantial assistance standard even in cases where attor-
neys are alleged to have acted with full knowledge of client
misconduct. 159 The norm could be strengthened by presuming that full-
service legal assistance in a business transaction constitutes substantial
assistance. Alternatively, and more aggressively, we could expand the
due diligence responsibilities of attorneys in business transactions.
Even without doctrinal change, modification could come from adding
new public or private enforcement resources, which would increase the
likelihood of detection and prosecution.
The expected benefits of strengthening the gatekeeper regime de-
pend on the nature of the changes made. Given the psychological im-
pediments preventing lawyers from acknowledging their own
complicity, low-level changes are unlikely to have much direct impact
on individual behaviors.160 So long as the standards of lawyer conduct
remain highly conflicted-an ambivalence that characterizes today's le-
gal rules-the cognitive status quo is likely to be preserved.
Presumably, however, some level of fear would change the calculus.
With assistance from bar associations, firms at least could be expected
to respond to the additional liability exposure. Clients needing outside
legal assistance could be expected to develop procedures that simplify
the lawyers' precautionary steps. But once again, skepticism is in order.
Neither cultures nor power structures change easily, and the autonomy
of individual partners in a firm is embedded strongly in both.'' In busi-
ness settings, there is much evidence that compliance procedures rarely
lawyers likely apply a fortiori with respect to inside counsel.
158. Another complicating factor is the fact that most standards, like Rule 10b-5, are not
lawyer-specific and cannot be adjusted without impacts far beyond the problem at hand.
159. See text accompanying notes 48-54.
160. In particular, rules that sanction knowing involvement are ineffective with respect to
cognitive blindness; reactive negligence rules-i.e., those that expect the lawyer to react to red
flags-suffer from the same problem.
161. See Nelson, Partners with Power at 37-86 (cited in note 90).
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work as designed. Psychologically, attorneys in many firms are likely to
acknowledge the presence of legal risk, but minimize it unduly with re-
spect to their own trusted partners. Finally, there are problems with
respect to multiple contracting and "black market" searches by clients
seeking pliant counsel.6
2
To the extent that stricter liability rules plausibly would generate
some gatekeeper benefits, next come questions of cost. Once again, pre-
cautionary steps are expensive; insofar as precaution is imperfect, the
residual risk must either be internalized or dealt with through pricing
or insurance. There are also more subtle costs. Changing the legal stan-
dards to make claims against lawyers easier to bring means not only
that litigation and administrative costs will increase, but also that the
incidence of low- or no-merit claims will mount as well, with the conse-
quent resource drain and reputational damage. 163 If lawyers become too
skittish, they may resign prematurely, when in fact the client is not
engaged in fraud.16" Law firms may become less willing to take on un-
known, speculative clients'65 or more likely to charge them a risk pre-
mium, a particular burden for smaller businesses. And there is the
concern, albeit extremely speculative, about chilling communications
between attorney and client. 6   All these are familiar fears, stated
162. See Kraakman, 2 J. L. Econ. & Org. at 69-74 (cited in note 11). Gatekeeping also may be
undermined to the extent that clients parcel out small aspects of a single project to a group of
lawyers, none of whom has the level of involvement necessary to comprehend the situation fully.
163. For a significant study documenting the likelihood that even low-merit claims will be
settled, see Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 497 (1991). Interestingly, California has a statutory provision
designed to make pretrial dismissal of claims against lawyers easier when they are alleged to have
improperly conspired with their clients, and this has been applied to aiding-and-abetting-type
claims. See Howard v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. Rep. 2d 575 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). Presumably, this
sort of process is justified on reputational grounds, although self-serving motivations may not be
unduly hard to find.
164. See Lorne, 76 Mich. L. Rev. at 455-57 (cited in note 4). That would not only disrupt the
lawyer-client relationship but also would threaten both reputational and confidentiality interests if
the resignation is sufficiently noisy. See note 22.
165. See Lowenfels, 74 Colum. L. Rev. at 436 (cited in note 4).
166. On one hand, it seems self-evident that clients who fear that lawyers might withhold
services if they learned the wrong thing would themselves limit the amount of information availa-
ble to the lawyers, thus reducing the quality of legal advice and perhaps, the lawyer's ability to
alter the client's plans. See Lorne, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 423 (cited in note 4). In DiLeo v. Ernst &
Young, 901 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1990), the court observed with respect to accountants' obligations
that under a strong gatekeeper regime "[flirms would withhold documents, allow auditors to see
but not copy, and otherwise emulate the CIA, if they feared that access might lead to destructive
disclosure-for even an honest firm may fear that one of its accountant's many auditors would
misunderstand the situation and ring the tocsin needlessly, with great loss to the firm." Id. at 629.
Others have pointed out, however, that the existing legal environment provides far less protection
to confidentiality than initially meets the eye (with the crime-fraud and attorney self-defense pro-
tections, for instance), yet there is no documented evidence of such a chill right now. See, for
example, Rhode, 37 Stan. L. Rev. at 612-14 (cited in note 13); Subin, 70 Iowa L. Rev. 1091 (cited in
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loudly during the last decades' debates over whistle-blowing. But none
can be dismissed out of hand.
In the end, deciding whether to alter the prevailing legal regime
can be nothing more than a "best guess" as to whether the likely bene-
fits exceed the expected costs. 1 67 Given the lack of base-rate data re-
garding how much fraud, or lawyer complicity exists or data to quantify
the specific costs that a stricter liability standard would cause, there is
little reason to hope that any such guess will be particularly accurate.
My own intuition is that the benefits of increasing sanctions would be
minimal, and the costs at least equal. If the psychologists are right,
however, intuitions-mine, or those of judges and other policymakers
charged with administering the legal regime-are extraordinarily suspi-
cious when they deal with questions as affective and value-laden as
these.
V. CONCLUSION
To help understand the phenomenon of lawyers aiding their cli-
ents' fraud, our discussion has offered two accounts beyond the simplis-
tic hypotheses of venality and stupidity. To some extent lawyers'
behavior may be shaped by conflicted legal rules that in many ways
undermine the general norm against knowingly assisting client fraud.
The weakening of the norm as applied signals lawyers that the compet-
ing norms of loyalty and confidentiality are primary, encouraging ra-
tionalization of continued involvement. Second, and perhaps more
important, there are reasons derived from research in social cognition to
doubt that lawyers will be very good gatekeepers once they have com-
mitted to representation and built a positive schema regarding the cli-
ent and the situation. Finally, we have suggested that while change is
possible through the modification of legal rules, we can be skeptical of
its likely efficacy.
We end with an irony. Work in social cognition predicts that its
note 5); Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 351, 378, 376 (1989) (offer-
ing evidence that confidentiality rules have relatively little effect on the behavior of clients in a
litigation setting). It does seem likely that clients who believe that they have little to hide will
place trust in their chosen lawyers regardless of the legal rules. Those with adverse facts in their
possession are likely to withhold it in any event, and are probably quite confident in their ability
to deceive their lawyer. In organizations, information blockages are likely to result from sources
having little to do with expectations of confidentiality. See, for example, John C. Coffee, Jr., Be-
yond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effec-
tive Legal Response, 63 Va. L. Rev. 1099, 1131-32 (1977).
167. Kraakman, 2 J. L. Econ. & Org. at 78 (cited in note 11). For a skeptical review of
whether the cost-benefit calculus is likely to be improved by imposing greater due diligence re-
sponsibilities on auditors, see John A. Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Instru-
mental Tort Reform, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 1929, 1960-68 (1988) (stressing the evasive nature of
auditors' responses to increased liability).
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own conclusions, particularly those based on pervasive situationalism,
will never be broadly embraced, no matter how well they are estab-
lished empirically. One of the strong themes in the social cognition
literature is the need for order and causal explanation. In judging
others, we look for dispositional flaws that explain why things went
wrong, rather than acknowledging the complex presence of situational
factors that make the action more ambiguous.168 The act of blaming
someone offers comfort and stability, for we can marginalize the wrong-
doers as deviant rather than the threatening product of chance. 169 In
many ways, our legal system generally, on issues far beyond lawyer in-
volvement in client fraud, serves to polarize the process of judging
others, providing a useful social illusion. Outsiders' strong perceptions
of lawyer complicity-the venality hypothesis-may be a product of
this need, aided by negative associations with impressions of excess li-
tigiousness and too much lawyer wealth. Perhaps these perceptions are
unfair.
170
Nor are lawyers likely to take a strong situationist perspective.
From the first day of law school, the legal profession celebrates hyperra-
tionality, '7 and so will hardly endorse a widespread characterization of
attorney behavior in which ego-driven thought processes interfere with
mindful scrutiny of the available facts and circumstances. That charac-
terization is too threatening to the profession's self-esteem. Instead, we
would guess that attitudes within the profession will be polarized, albeit
in similarly self-protective ways. Consistent with the ego protection as-
sociated with excessive blaming, some will call for exceptionally harsh
treatment of deviant lawyers who have breached the sacred trust.
Others, by contrast, will develop attitudes that are too forgiving of their
reputable colleagues. While excessive blaming may be the norm, insuffi-
cient blaming is a predictable tendency when those passing judgment
see so much of themselves in the actor and the situation that they are
unable to dismiss the behavior as mere deviance.7 2 The fearful "there
168. See Nisbett and Ross, Human Inference at 3-4, 204 (cited in note 98).
169. See Shaver, The Attribution of Blame at 132-34 (cited in note 138); Jack Katz, Seduc-
tions of Crime 316-17 (1988); Melvin Lerner, The Belief in a Just World 20-22, 118-22 (1980). See
also note 138.
170. For an interesting discussion of how policymakers should deal with biased perceptions
by the public involving societal risks, see Sarah Lichtenstein, Robin Gregory, Paul Slovic and Wil-
lem A. Wagenaar, When Lives are in Your Hands: Dilemmas of the Societal Decision Maker, in
Hogarth, ed., Insights in Decision Making at 91 (cited in note 90).
171. Legal academics, too, are likely to resist these characterizations for a variety of reasons,
one of the most significant of which is that it diminishes the role of law in behavior and hence the
apthority of legal reasoning. See Langevoort, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 916-19 (cited in note 85).
172. See Shaver, The Attribution of Blame at 135 (cited in note 138). The judging of moral
(and presumably legal) responsibility also is affected by class and other factors. Persons of lower
status positions are more willing to accept excuses based on submission to authority, presumably
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but for the grace of God go I" may lead preconsciously to attitudes
about lawyer complicity that too readily accept duping or similar expla-
nations. For reasons apart from crass self-protectionism, then, a legal
system administered largely by judges and lawyer policymakers could
evolve over time to be excessively accommodating to their once or fu-
ture colleagues if that cognition dominates.
173
So, we have a problem-if there is one at all-that few people are
motivated to evaluate without bias. There may be good reason to accept
more willingly the excuses of lawyers strangely blind to their clients'
fraud. Consistency, however, suggests that we should not do so without
acknowledging that comparable blindness affects many nonlawyers
whom we smugly blame in tort and criminal law as we characterize
their conduct as intentional or negligent.
174
In the end, the issue of lawyer complicity is only dimly illuminated
by what we in fact know. The relative incidence of venality, ego-in-
duced blindness and actual duping is something about which we can
only wonder. We are thus free to view the issue as we wish, perhaps
without realizing the inventive nature of our perception. Sadly, the pre-
vailing rules of attorney behavior probably will continue to reflect a
clash of unconscious biases, not rational estimation. In that, however, it
differs from other hard legal choices only in the peculiarly self-serving
nature of the likely solutions.
because of the identification between actor and observer. See Carl W. Backman, Identity, Self
Presentation, and the Resolution of Moral Dilemmas: Towards a Social Psychological Theory of
Moral Behavior, in Schlenker, ed., The Self and Social Life at 275-76 (cited in note 88).
173. Without offering this as a primary explanation, we can at least note that many of the
doctrinal developments we have traced are consistent with this prediction.
174. Compare Rhode, 37 Stan. L. Rev. at 619-20 (cited in note 13) (criticizing lawyers who
claim an inability to know of client wrongdoing while holding people generally to sanction under
comparable legal rules).
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